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Since 1999, the member states of the European Union (EU) have been pursuing 
capabilities to conduct conflict prevention and crisis management operations.  The EU 
has no intention of usurping NATOs role in collective defense; but it intends to 
strengthen its influence in international politics and to acquire more options for crisis 
management.  This thesis analyzes the EUs emerging role in the management of 
international security challenges and its implications for the future of NATO, the trans-
Atlantic link and the EU itself.  It explores the nature and scope of the crisis management 
role the EU intends to play, critically examines the prospects for the development of the 
requisite military capabilities in the EU, and assesses the impact of the EUs emerging 
role on NATO.  From the standpoint of the United States (and other non-EU NATO 
Allies, such as Norway and Turkey), close NATO-EU cooperation is imperative.  The 
thesis concludes that the extent to which NATO and the EU coordinate their planning 
will be a decisive factor in the success of CESDP.  The EUs emerging security role is a 
new test for the strength and resilience of the trans-Atlantic ties given formal expression 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Since 1999, the member states of the European Union (EU) have been pursuing 
capabilities to conduct conflict prevention and crisis management operations.  The EU 
has no intention of usurping NATOs role in collective defense; but it intends to 
strengthen its influence in international politics and to acquire more options for crisis 
management.   
This thesis analyzes the EUs emerging role in the management of international 
security challenges and its implications for the future of NATO, the trans-Atlantic link 
and the EU itself.  It explores the nature and scope of the crisis management role the EU 
intends to play, critically examines the prospects for the development of the requisite 
military capabilities in the EU, and assesses the impact of the EUs emerging role on 
NATO.  It is evident that the EU will not be able to independently conduct the full range 
of Petersberg tasks at any time in the near future if an operation as demanding as 
NATOs intervention in the Kosovo conflict was contemplated as an example of the 
peace making envisaged as one of the Petersberg tasks.  However, the EU will likely be 
able to carry out humanitarian and peacekeeping missions with limited assistance from 
NATO.  Supplying the necessary equipment and support (intelligence, logistics, 
communications architecture, training, etc.) for the EUs military forces represents a 
genuine challenge, given the budgetary priorities of EU governments.  Only by 
significantly increasing defense spending, which is not evidently in the future plans of 
most EU member states, will the EU ever be able to achieve its December 1999 
Headline Goal (that is, a 50-60,000 troop rapid reaction force capable of being 
deployed within 60 days and sustained in operations for up to a year in duration) and its 
x 
other capability goals.  This will not only take time; more importantly, it will require 
political will and sustained commitment by the various member countries to provide the 
funds and other resources.     
At this early stage, it is difficult to forecast whether the EUs Common European 
Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) will ultimately undermine NATO or whether it 
will strengthen the Alliance and draw the United States and Europe closer together.  The 
latter is, of course, the desired end state from the standpoint of the United States (and 
other non-EU NATO Allies, such as Norway and Turkey).  The United States supports an 
independent European Union capability as a way of strengthening the transatlantic 
relationship, but considers it imperative that the EUs new security role be developed 
within the framework of NATO, lest the future of the Alliance be threatened.  If NATO 
crumbled, the security of Europe would be at stake and the transatlantic ties would have 
to be placed on new institutional foundations.   
It will be incumbent upon the EU and NATO both to ensure that the structures 
being put in place now for close interaction will be effective and durable.  In addition, the 
United States must remain actively engaged with the European Union as the framework 
for CESDP develops.  This is absolutely necessary if America wants to safeguard its 
interests in Europe and, indeed, the larger interests of the Alliance as a whole, including 
peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region.  The reality is that the EU will pursue 
CESDP.  The United States accepts and supports this effort as long as it is done correctly, 
that is, in close cooperation with NATO and in a way that leads to tangible improvements 
in military capabilities.  It is recognized on both sides of the Atlantic, however, that the 
xi 
EUs emerging security role is a new and challenging test for the strength and resilience 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 The European Unions (EU) emerging role in security matters raises several 
questions that should be addressed before the organization takes the next steps to forge 
ahead with the project.  This thesis focuses on questions concerning the impact of the 
EUs emerging security role on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
trans-Atlantic relationship in particular, while touching on the effects it may have on 
other entities such as the Western European Union (WEU) and EU candidate states.  The 
key questions examined in this thesis are as follows:  
(1) What is the nature and scope of the security role that the EU intends to play?  
(2) What are the military capabilities required for the security role that the EU 
intends to play and will the EU member states realistically be able to meet 
their force goals? 
(3) What are the political-military structures that will be put in place to coordinate 
between the EU, NATO, the WEU and other entities such as EU candidate 
states to handle crisis management tasks? 
 (4) How will this emerging security role affect NATO? 
 (5) What effects will the EUs Common European Security and Defense Policy        
(CESDP) have on the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within         
NATO? 
2 
(6) What will the relationship be between the EUs political-military structure and 
NATO and will the proposed structures be able to coordinate successfully              
between the two organizations? 
 (7) What effect will CESDP have on trans-Atlantic relations in security          
matters?  
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU’S SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY 
For the past fifty years, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been 
the focal point for defense policy in Western Europe while the European Union (EU) has 
been primarily occupied with economic and commercial matters.  It should nonetheless 
be recalled that the European Union (including its predecessor organizations) was 
originally established not just for economic reasons, but also for security reasons.  The 
European Coal and Steel Community (1951) and the European Economic Community 
(1957) represented steps in an effort to maintain peace and security in Europe in the 
aftermath of two world wars that had left severe marks on the continent.  From this 
perspective, the EU has been successful in certain security matters for many years.    
External security was never one of its original goals, however.  The EU (including 
its predecessor organizations) has consistently suffered from a sense of impotence in 
terms of its political influence in international security affairs despite efforts to improve 
its standing.  In 1970, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands formed the policy consultation and coordination arrangement known as 
European Political Cooperation (EPC), which was broadened in scope ten years later to 
include political and economic aspects of security.  The European Community (EC) 
3 
articulated its aspirations in documents such as the 1973 Copenhagen report, which stated 
that Europe had to make its voice heard in world affairs1 and the 1981 London Report, 
which declared, The Ten should seek increasingly to shape events, and not simply to 
react to them.2  In the Preamble to the Single European Act (1986), the member states 
professed their ambition to more effectively  promote [the ECs] common interests 
and independence.3  Political cooperation was on the agenda, but in the bipolar Cold 
War environment that existed until the 1990s, there was no great incentive to create a 
strong political, let alone military, capability. Indeed, in light of the failure of the 
European Defense Community in 1954 and the withdrawal of France from the integrated 
military structure of NATO in 1966, and particularly the existence of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) as the predominant means of ensuring defense and security 
in Western Europe, there was no strategic vision for common political or external 
security cooperation.   
The change in geopolitical circumstances brought about by the end of the Cold 
War forced a reappraisal of the ECs political and security role.  The 1991 Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union was significant in that, in addition to laying the groundwork 
for monetary union, it established the EUs Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
to allow the EU to play a political role in the international arena commensurate with its 
                                                 
1 Copenhagen report quoted in Philippe in De Schoutheete, The Case for Europe (Boulder, Co: Lynne 




status as an economic power.4   While the Maastricht Treaty contained ambitious words 
reflecting the desire of the member states to build a CFSP, it did not provide the tools to 
accomplish this objective and thus failed to make any progress.  As Philippe De 
Schoutheete has pointed out,  
There was no provision for common reflection and 
analysis, nor a political motor to initiate action, nor any 
operational decision-making procedure, nor any visible and 
collective enforcement instrument.  Those omissions  
reflect the clear intention of the member states, or at least 
that of the principal member states, to avoid surrendering 
any of the instruments of power in this domain.5 
The member states agreed in theory about what they wanted to achieve, but they lacked 
the political will and commitment to take action.  In De Schoutheetes words, The 
paradox lies in the gap between the declared objective and the available instruments; and 
from that paradox stems impotence.6   
A marked change in attitude, particularly on the part of Britain, toward common 
defense and security took place during the French-British summit at St. Malo in 
December 1998, which resulted in agreement that: 
The European Union needs to be in a position to play its 
full role on the international stage This includes the 
responsibility of the European Council to decide on the 
progressive framing of a common defence policy in the 
framework of CFSP.To this end, the Union must have 
the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
                                                 
4The Council of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy.   Available 
Online at http://ue.eu.int/pesc/pres.asp?lang=eng#SCRL1. 
5 De Schoutheete, The Case for Europe, p. 78.  
6 Ibid.  Joint Declaration Issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 December 
1998.  Available Online: http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?1795. 
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military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international 
crises.While acting in conformity with our respective 
obligations in NATO , we are contributing to the vitality of 
a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of 
the collective defence of its members.The Union must be 
given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of 
situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for 
relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary 
duplication. In this regard, the European Union will also 
need to have recourse to suitable military means.7  
While all previous attempts to establish a multinational European security and 
defense entity more effective than the WEU had been unsuccessful, it appeared that the 
initiatives made at St. Malo showed true promise.  The main reason for this breakthrough, 
as Jolyon Howorth points out, is that Britain had finally lifted its effective veto on any 
structured linkage between, on the one hand, the EEC/EC/EU as an institutional 
organization and, on the other hand, European defence issues.8  Cooperation between 
the French and the British, who have traditionally taken distinct positions on NATO, the 
WEU, and other institutions for defense and security in Europe, is essential towards 
progress on this issue.  London and Paris have begun to agree on some of the 
fundamental issues, even if they are not quite on the same sheet of music in all 
respects.   
In short, during the 1990s the strength of the CFSP was undermined by a lack of 
consensus about committing military capabilities to conduct common tasks.  The Kosovo 
                                                 
7 Joint Declaration Issued at the British-French Summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998.  
Available Online: http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?1795. 
8 Jolyon Howorth, European Integration and Defence, the Ultimate Challenge, Chaillot Paper No. 43, 
(Paris: Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, November 2000), p. 3. 
6 
crisis in the spring of 1999 highlighted the military weakness of the EU states -- a 
weakness revealed during the Bosnia crisis in 1992-95.  Riding on the momentum of St. 
Malo and the EUs inability to handle the crisis in the Balkans without U.S. assistance via 
NATO, the EU member states declared their intention at the European Council summit 
meetings in Cologne (June 1999) and Helsinki (December 1999) to reinforce the CFSP 
by developing their own collective military capability to respond to international crises.  
While the NATO Allies have continued to develop the concept of a European Security 
and Defense Identity (ESDI) that they endorsed in the early 1990s to gain greater 
European capacity for autonomous military action,9 the EU has also taken steps toward 
a similar end.  According to the Helsinki Summit report of December 1999,  "The 
[European] Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible 
military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to 
respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO."10  In order to 
achieve this objective, the EU member states have decided to develop more effective 
military capabilities and establish new political and military structures for these tasks.11
 The Helsinki report specifies military capability objectives to support the 
                                                 
9 David Yost, NATO Transformed, (Washington, D.C.:  United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 
p. 77.  The Council of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy.  Available 
Online:  http://ue.eu.int/pesc/pres.asp?lang=en#SCRL1. 
10 The Council of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy.  Available 
Online:  http://ue.eu.int/pesc/pres.asp?lang=en#SCRL1.  Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European 
Council, 10 and 11 December 1999.  Available Online:  
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=PRES/99/3000[0[RAPID&lg=EN. 




Common European Security and Defense Policy which was set forth at the Cologne 
European Council in June 1999.  In particular, the EU member states have set their own 
headline goal, to be reached by 2003, of being able to  
deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full 
range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam 
Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to 
corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). 
These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the 
necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, 
logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as 
appropriate, air and naval elements.12   
Moreover, three new permanent political-military bodies will be set up within the 
European Council:  a Political and Security Council (PSC), a Military Committee, and a 
Military Staff.     
C. IMPORTANCE 
 This new Common European Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) is intended 
to allow the EU to assume responsibilities for the full range of conflict prevention and 
crisis management operations known as the Petersberg tasks.  First announced at the 
WEUs Ministerial meeting in Petersberg, near Bonn, Germany, in 1992, the Petersberg 
tasks were included in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty on European Union.  The tasks 
include humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; [and] tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.13   
                                                 
12 Ibid.  Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Bonn, June 19, 1992, Peterspberg 
Declaration, par 4 of Part II, On Strengthening WEUs Operational Role. 
13 Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Bonn, June 19, 1992, Peterspberg Declaration, 
par 4 of Part II, On Strengthening WEUs Operational Role.  François Heisbourg, European Defence 
Takes a Leap Forward. NATO Review, Spring/Summer 2000, p.10. 
8 
Developing such capabilities, however, will not only take time; more importantly, 
it will require political will and sustained commitment by the various member countries 
to provide the money and resources necessary to build the military forces desired.  It will 
also be important for NATO and the EU to work together to avoid duplication of effort 
where it is not desired; and to a large extent, this will involve close cooperation in 
defense planning, procurement exercises, and training. Although some forms of 
duplication are desired, others are not.  François Heisbourg, Chairman for the Geneva 
Center for Security Policy, writes:  Duplication is no doubt useful in areas where all 
NATOs members are lacking.  Air transport, SEAD [Suppression of Enemy Air 
Defenses] and OEW [Offensive Electronic Warfare], in-flight refueling, GPS [Global 
Positioning Systems]-guided ordnance, CALCMs [Conventional Air-Launched Cruise 
Missiles]14 are all desirable capabilities to acquire, although the United States is surely 
better equipped at present than its European allies.  On the other hand, the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and other Atlanticist nations do not want any duplication in 
defense planning or the command structure. Efforts are underway to define more 
precisely the types of operations the EU wishes to be able to conduct, including the 
geographical boundaries of those operations.   As part of this effort, the extent to which 
the forces of EU nations will be expected to operate on their own or as part of a NATO-
led operation also needs to be delineated.   
                                                 
14 François Heisbourg, European Defence Takes a Leap Forward. NATO Review, Spring/Summer 
2000, p.10. 
9 
Certainly, as the Helsinki report asserts, NATO remains the foundation of the 
collective defense of its members, and will continue to have an important role in crisis 
management.15 8 The EU has no intention of usurping NATOs role in collective 
defense; but there are strong incentives for it to develop a greater capacity to deal with 
security challenges other than collective defense.  This would strengthen its political 
authority in the international arena and provide it with more options when crises arise.  
The extent to which NATO and the EU coordinate their crisis management efforts as well 
as the strength and resilience of the trans-Atlantic ties will be determining factors in the 
success of CESDP.      . 
D. METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 This thesis analyzes the EUs emerging role in the management of international 
security challenges and its implications for the future of NATO, the trans-Atlantic link 
and the EU itself.  It is based on qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources.  
The primary sources include official European Union documents (such as European 
Council reports) covering this topic, official speeches of EU, NATO, United States and 
European government officials, and official defense documents.  Secondary sources 
consist primarily of analytical studies.  These include reports published by the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (such as Adelphi Papers and articles in 
Survival) and Chaillot Papers published by the WEUs Institute for Security Studies.  
                                                 
15 Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council, 10 and 11 December 1999.   
10 
 The purpose of this first chapter has been to provide an overview of how the EUs 
role in security has evolved, highlighting in particular the events since 1998 which have 
truly given momentum to the idea of a Common European Security and Defense Policy 
and the incentives for the EU to develop its own military capability.  The second chapter 
explores the nature and scope of the security roles that the EU intends to play, which are 
usually summed up in the phrase the Petersberg tasks, which include missions such as 
crisis management.  The chapter reviews the EUs history in dealing with crisis 
management, including the apparent reasons for its lack of success, and examines 
definitions of the Petersberg tasks.   Whether the EU truly intends to be able to carry out 
its crisis management tasks in a fully autonomous manner raises questions about its 
military capabilities, which are examined in the third chapter.  The Headline Goal stated 
at Helsinki in December 1999 provides a starting point for the EU to develop a military 
capability, but is that enough for what it wants to do?  This chapter analyzes the ability of 
the various member states to contribute toward a military capability and identifies the key 
deficiencies that need to be addressed.    The assessed capabilities gap between the 
United States and the EU is briefly examined too, since it is an important part of any 
discussion dealing with the development of European military capabilities.   
 Developing military capabilities is only part of the equation for CESDP.  Equally 
important is the foundation of political-military structures that need to be in place for the 
EU to deal decisively and effectively with security challenges.  Both areas  the military 
capabilities and institutional framework  will require cooperation with NATO.  The 
fourth chapter, therefore, assesses the impact of the EUs emerging role on NATO with a 
11 
focus on the structures put in place for coordination with NATO.   The interaction 
between ESDI and CESDP necessarily forms part of this discussion.   Since the nature of 
the relationship between NATO and the EU in security matters will have a significant 
impact on the trans-Atlantic relationship, the last part of chapter four is devoted to the 
U.S. view of CESDP.  Finally, the fifth chapter concludes with reflections on the various 
outcomes that could result from Europes new security role, particularly as they relate to 
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II. CRISIS MANAGEMENT TASKS AND THE EU’S 
INVOLVEMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins by exploring crisis management,16 which is by no means a 
simple topic.  The purpose is to provide perspectives about what the EU is facing as it 
seeks to develop a capability to address the full range of Petersberg tasks.  After a survey 
of the range of crisis management tasks and peace operations, the EUs involvement in 
crisis management is discussed.  While the EU has dealt with crisis management to a 
certain degree throughout its existence, the role it seeks now is a greatly expanded one 
that includes the option of using force.   This chapter helps to explain why the EU needs 
to formulate criteria for engagement which delineate when, where and how it may take 
action to deal with crises.   The complicated nature of contemporary crises demands it.    
B. AN EXPLORATION OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
 Crisis management runs the gamut of crisis-oriented tasks from conflict 
prevention and conflict avoidance to conflict resolution.   It encompasses intervention in 
external conflicts to support for peacekeeping operations, peace making, peace 
enforcement, peace building, and humanitarian assistance and evacuation. Jarat Chopra 
distinguishes peace maintenance from diplomatic peacekeeping and military peace 
enforcement.  According to Chopra, peace maintenance refers to the overall political 
framework, as part of which the objectives of diplomatic activities, humanitarian 
                                                 
16 For the purposes of this thesis, crisis management and conflict management are the same, but the 
term crisis management will be used as consistently as possible. 
14 
assistance, military forces, and civilian components are not only coordinated but 
harmonized.17  According to the Alliances 1991 Strategic Concept, NATOs crisis 
management tasks involve responding to threats and risks that are multifaceted in 
nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict.18  Not only are they 
hard to predict, but they are also difficult to plan for and usually complex.  There are no 
quick fixes or easy solutions.   In fact, once the progression of the crisis management 
tasks has evolved from prevention to management and resolution to post-conflict 
settlement, the long-term prospects are often overwhelming.   
A prevention strategy should be possible, but despite early 
warning, it is difficult to gain international consensus for 
early action to chart a course that appears to all players to 
be effective and of reasonable cost.  Yet there is also no 
way to stay uninvolved.Even worse, involvement, once it 
starts, seems never-ending.19   
The Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia, still in place over five years after the 1995 
Dayton Accords brought a provisional end to the Bosnian War, and the UN 
(Peacekeeping) Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP)20 still on the island 35 years after the 
ceasefire, are but two examples of crises that have dragged on.   
                                                 
17 Jarat Chopra, ed., The Politics of Peace Maintenance (Boulder:  Lynne Rienner Publisher, Inc., 
1998). 
18 Yost, NATO Transformed, p. 192, citing NATOs 1991 Strategic Concept, par 9, 47. 
19 Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes, Planning for Intervention, International Cooperation 
in Conflict Management (The Hague, Netherlands:  Kluwar Law International, 1999), p.3. 
20 The United Nations has had peacekeeping forces on Cyprus since 1964. The size of UNFICYP is 
now 1,219, with ten countries participating. For more in formation, see the Cyprus, Status of UN 
Negotiations, a CRS Issue Brief for Congress, available online at http://www.house.gov/pallone/newslet-
cyprus-CRS.htm#_1_19. 
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 At the beginning of the spectrum of crisis management is conflict prevention, or 
more specifically, those measures taken to lessen the probability of violent conflict.  
General conflict should not necessarily be avoided ─ nor in fact can it be ─ for it is one 
of the means of bringing about social change.   However, armed violent conflict should 
be prevented, if possible.  Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse 
distinguish between light preventive intervention and deep preventive intervention.  The 
former involves a combination of crisis management and preventive diplomacy with the 
aim of preventing threshold conflicts from becoming severe, full-blown violent ones, 
while the latter seeks to correct the root causes of the conflict, to include resolving 
underlying political, ideological, or religious disputes and/or clashes of interest.  In the 
context of post-Cold War conflicts, light prevention generally means improving the 
international capacity to intervene in conflicts before they become violent; deep 
prevention means building domestic, regional or international capacity to manage 
conflict.21    
 The light prevention policy measures that Miall et al. discuss range from 
official diplomacy to non-official diplomacy (such as private mediation) to efforts by 
local actors to establish peace.  Powerful states or organizations can also coerce 
governments into taking certain actions, strengthen moderate leaders and mitigate the 
influence of extremists.  This can be done through political measures, economic measures 
and military measures (such as preventive peacekeeping, arms embargoes, and 
                                                 
21 Hugh Miall, Oliver Ramsbotham, and Tom Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press and Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1999), p. 97. 
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demilitarization).22  One of the examples of successful prevention of imminent armed 
conflict is the UN operation in 1992 in Macedonia, otherwise known as the UN 
Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).  Policy options for deep prevention 
include strengthening or restoring governance, assisting election processes, supporting 
fair trials and promoting independent media.23  Certainly, the effectiveness of these 
policies depends on the circumstances of the situation; but preventing a crisis from 
breaking out in violence, if possible, may benefit all concerned. 
 Unfortunately, many crises are not prevented and the role of interested external 
powers may become one of managing a violent conflict while it is taking place, with the 
aim of mitigating, containing, and eventually resolving it.  It is for this purpose that 
peacekeeping, peace making and peace enforcement may come into play.  It is important 
to point out, though, that classic peacekeeping, which involved impartial, non-forcible 
military deployments, with the consent of local antagonists, is not always possible. It is 
obviously preferable to uphold circumstances in which a ceasefire is in place, the consent 
of the parties to the conflict has been obtained, and light arms are used by the 
peacekeepers only for self-defense.  In post-Cold War conflicts, however, in many cases 
the belligerents have not concluded a working ceasefire, the peacekeepers are heavily 
armed, and one or both parties to the conflict have not given their consent for 
intervention.  
                                                 
22 Ibid., p. 111,113. 
23 Ibid., p. 113. 
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 Peacekeeping has thus evolved into a more forceful effort in which the 
peacekeepers must take the offensive to restore order. This approach is sometimes called 
second generation peacekeeping.  UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali 
developed the term peace making to describe this more forceful role, defined as action 
to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through peaceful means.24 Additionally, 
second generation peacekeepers have often performed tasks such as monitoring 
elections, disarming insurgents, and training police. Closely related to peacemaking is 
peace enforcement, which is essentially the imposition of a settlement by a powerful third 
party.  The situation changes dramatically for the peacekeepers on the ground when a 
permissive environment becomes a non-permissive one because force protection becomes 
a critical issue.  For this reason, many experts on the subject maintain that building and 
maintaining the consent of the local antagonists regarding the legitimacy of the 
peacekeeping intervention should be one of the main foci of action.    
 With regard to working towards resolution of a conflict, UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan has cited the need for peacekeeping forces to find new capabilities for what 
he [Annan] refers to as positive inducements to gain support for peacekeeping mandates 
amongst populations in conflict zones.25  Annan has argued that reliance on coercion 
will not work because its effects are only temporary and will erode over time.  True 
conflict resolution, or a durable peace, requires taking an extra step beyond putting an 
                                                 
24 Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
keeping (New York:  United Nations, 1992), p.11. 
25 Annan quoted in indirect discourse in Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, p. 143.   
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end to the violence: that is, providing positive incentives.26   The complicated nature of 
this task is readily apparent, as Miall et al. explain: 
Working in conflict zones thus becomes a complex process 
of balancing coercive inducements with positive 
inducements, of supplementing military containment and 
humanitarian relief roles and of promoting civic action to 
rebuild communities economically, politically and socially.  
A wide range of actors and agencies, military and civilian, 
governmental and non-governmental, indigenous and 
external, therefore constitute the conflict resolution 
capability in war zones.27   
 Once the crisis has been successfully resolved, post-conflict peace-building takes 
over.  Boutros Ghali defined peace-building as action to identify and support structures 
which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict.28  The two main tasks of peace-building are contained in this definition.  
Preventing a relapse is the more immediate objective while strengthening peace demands 
a long-term effort.  Boutros Boutros Ghali specified some of the tasks involved in 1992: 
disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration 
of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, 
repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for 
security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts 
to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening 
governmental institutions and promoting formal and 
informal processes of political participation.29  
 
                                                 
26 Ibid. 
27 Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, p. 144. 
28 Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
keeping, p. 11. 
29 Ibid., p. 32. 
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R. Paris called peace-building an enormous experiment in social engineering.30  
Indeed, this part of crisis management could be the most difficult to achieve.  It is often 
the most time-consuming as well, when one considers the amount of time necessary to 
create lasting peace at the grass roots level, as the examples of the UN in Cyprus and 
SFOR in Bosnia suggest.  It appears that the Kosovo Force (KFOR) may remain in 
Kosovo indefinitely unless the replacement of Milosevic by Kostunica in October 2000 
leads to circumstances that render the presence of external peacekeepers unnecessary.  
Many officials in NATO governments feel that the new regime holds new hope for 
nearer-term solutions.  The process of working at the deeper level of reforming 
institutions and civil society takes crisis management to a new level.  Yet without this last 
step in the spectrum of peace operations, all the efforts that preceded it may be wasted if 
violence breaks out again.  
C. THE EU’S PAST INVOLVEMENT IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
 Successful management of contemporary crises can rarely be achieved by one 
organization or entity, and the EU has recognized this.  Multiple international security 
organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and states usually play a role.  
Moreover, crisis management is always carried out through some combination of 
diplomacy and force.   Diplomacy is the preferred approach  and often the first used  
while force is generally the last resort.  Indeed, force can be  and often is  effective as 
an element in conflict resolution.  For example, it can be used  
                                                 
30 Quote from R. Paris from Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism, International 
Security, 22 (2) 1997 in Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, p. 195. 
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as part of a peace support operation in order to neutralize 
those who themselves use force to perpetrate atrocities, 
prey on civilian populations or prevent an otherwise 
peaceful settlement which has majority support.  
Butforce has a strictly limited role to play and only as 
part of a wider conflict resolution process.31      
 
Even if force is not used, though, often it is the threat of force that provides the credibility 
needed for diplomacy to work.  The difference between the EUs role in crisis 
management in the past and the role that it envisions for the future resides in the prospect 
of using force.  Not being able to use force has had significant implications for the EUs 
success, or lack thereof, in crisis management.  This is one of the main reasons why the 
EUs efforts in conflict management have been unsuccessful so far.     
 The Yugoslav crisis in the early 1990s is a prime example of the EUs efforts both 
to prevent and to contain crises.32 When Slovenia and Croatia began making moves 
toward secession in the face of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevics determined 
efforts to keep the Yugoslav federation together in early 1990, the time was ripe for the 
interested external powers to intervene before a full-blown crisis erupted.  While it is 
highly questionable whether the outbreak of war could have been prevented, the main 
external powers and their institutions (including the EC) have been blamed for the way 
they responded to the conflict, including their failure to mitigate the violence.  The ECs 
first failure in the Balkans, then, was in conflict prevention.   
                                                 
31 Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, p. 221. 
32 From 1967 to 1993 the EU was known as the EC (European Community).  The EU name was 
officially adopted in November 1993, when the Treaty on European Union entered into force.  This 
discussion will employ the terms used during the periods in question. 
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The EC made a difficult situation worse, by first insisting 
on Yugoslavias territorial integrity, at a time when this 
course played into Milosevics hands, and then abruptly 
changing direction after the Slovenian and Croatian 
secssions and supporting them against Serbia, despite 
recommendations of the Badinter Commission33 and the 
danger to Bosnia.34   
 
The second failure of the EC in Yugoslavia was its inability to contain the conflict.  In 
1991, the European Council decided to send 50 observers to Slovenia, and later to 
Croatia, to monitor (not enforce) the implementation of the ceasefire.35  To its credit, the 
EC was the first organization to assume responsibility during the first stage of the 
military conflict.  (NATO and the WEU were not asked to take action until mid-1992.) 
Unfortunately, the EC observer mission was hindered in carrying out its objective in the 
escalating war in Croatia by its limited mandate and its lack of means to enforce it.  
Furthermore, the EC member states were unable to reach consensus, particularly as a 
result of Britains opposition, on sending in military forces under WEU auspices.  The 
repudiation of the use of armed force under almost any circumstances weakened the 
                                                 
33 As violence spread in Croatia, the EC announced on 27 August 1991 that it was establishing a Peace 
Conference on Yugoslavia and an Arbitration Commission comprising five presidents from among the 
various constitutional courts of the EC countries.  The Arbitration Commission became known as the 
Badinter Commission after the name of the French lawyer appointed as its president. The EC retracted its 
position that Yugoslavia's borders could not be altered and set up the Badinter Commission to determine 
the ECs criteria for recognizing Yugoslav successor states. 
34 Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, p. 119. 
35 Werner Bauwens and Luc Reychler, eds., The Art of Conflict Prevention, Brasseys Atlantic 
Commentaries No. 7 (London:  Brasseys, 1994), p. 151. 
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influence of the EC over the escalating crisis in Yugoslavia.36  Ultimately, the UN and 
NATO had to step in.37 
 The Albanian crisis in 1997 has also been cited as an example of the EUs failure 
in crisis management.  Stemming from a combination of the Tirana governments failed 
pyramid schemes and President Berishas decision to conduct the 1996 elections in a 
manner widely considered to be neither free nor fair, civil war broke out in March 1997.  
The Albanian state started to crumble, armed rebels took over government armories in the 
southern part of the country, and approximately 1800 people were killed in the anarchy 
that followed.   The army and police force also disintegrated.    
The EU, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, NATO and the WEU (as well as 
particular states, notably Greece and Italy) expressed alarm over the unrest in Albania, 
particularly because of the potential for extensive regional consequences; however, none 
of these organizations or states could come to any agreement over what measures should 
be taken.  NATO and the WEU monitored the events in Albania but did not make any 
decisions  or even seriously contemplate any decisions  to intervene.  Meanwhile, as 
the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the EU carried out their shuttle diplomacy, the 
situation continued to deteriorate.    
                                                 
36 Ibid., p. 152. 
37 For a brief account of the conflict, including the critical events in 1995 that led to the Dayton 
Accords and the establishment of SFOR, see Yost, NATO Transformed, pp. 192-199.  Public Perception of 
the WEUs Contribution to Stabilising Democracy in Albania  reply to the annual report of the Council, 
WEU Assembly Report 1650E (19 May 1999).  Available Online at 
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The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1101 at the end of March 
1997 to allow for a Multinational Protection Force (MPF) to be set up and deployed, 
under Italian command, in April 1997.   A coalition of the willing comprised of eleven 
states (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, 
Spain and Turkey) participated in Operation Alba, as the MPF deployment was called.  
Although the operation was successful in some respects, it was a failure for European 
organizations such as the EU, as the MPF Commander, Admiral Guido Venturoni, 
pointed at later:  
Mission Alba was the first crisis-management mission 
conducted in Europe by a multinational military force 
comprised of Europeans only and, in my opinion, it proved 
both the determination and the capability of the European 
countries to plan and conduct peace-support operations in a 
difficult situation like Albania. But at the same time it was 
probably a failure for existing European institutions. I say 
this with regret, although Italy was at the helm, because a 
"coalition of the willing" should not be the preferred option 
for future European crisis-management operations.38  
Widely viewed as a missed opportunity by not only the EU, but WEU and NATO as 
well, the Albanian crisis was clearly a failure in conflict prevention; and a large part of 
that failure was due to lack of political consensus over what actions to take as the crisis 
was developing.  Admiral Venturoni emphasized this point when he stated, "The 
Albanian crisis, although evident since January 1997, did not generate any preventive 
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action. As a matter of fact the slow and somewhat hesitating response by the international 
community and the Euro-Atlantic institutions proved unable to prevent the crisis."39  
 The tools that the EU (including its predecessor organizations) has had to back its 
conflict management efforts have included, in some cases, the promise of accession to the 
EU and the promise (or threat) of economic benefits (or sanctions).  Today, these tools 
are usually not enough.  While the United States and Soviet Union, as superpowers, 
tended to use power projection, ideological warfare, and coercive diplomacy during the 
Cold War in resolving crises, the EU (including its predecessor organizations) has always 
 by necessity  preferred moral persuasion, dialogue and cooperation, peaceful change 
and conflict resolution without force.40   
 In some cases this approach led to success.   The ECs diplomacy, for example, 
contributed to arrangements intended to de-escalate potential East-West confrontations 
through reconciliation and dialogue in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe.  The ECs emphasis on the importance of the Stockholm Conference on 
Disarmament in Europe contributed to the conferences success, ultimately resulting in 
the Warsaw Pacts first acceptance of the principle of on-site inspection.41  Moreover, in 
                                                 
39 Ibid.. 
40 The U.S. use of force and coercive diplomacy during the Cold War often reflected circumstances 
deriving from the competition with the USSR.  As a democracy, the United States has always favored the 
peaceful resolution of disputes. 
41 Bauwens and Reychler, explanation of footnote reference 48, p. 176. 
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1992 the EC arbitrated to prevent the political conflict between Hungary and Slovakia 
from escalating any further over the issue of barrage on the Danube.42    
 Unfortunately, although moral persuasion is clearly a preferable means to solve 
crises, it is usually not effective; but the EU (including its predecessors) had no other 
choice.  The organization did not have the force needed for coercive diplomacy.  
Furthermore, until 1998, the member states could never agree on creating any force 
capability under EU auspices or using the WEU as the military arm of the EU in actual 
operations.  Now at last, there seems to be consensus in the EU  including in Britain  
that a military capability is necessary if the EU truly wants political clout and the 
capability to effectively manage a crisis.    
D. THE EU’S ENVISIONED ROLE IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
   The mandate that the EU has for crisis management, Bauwens and Reychler 
point out, stems originally from the 1992 Treaty on European Union, which spelled out 
the purpose of the EUs CFSP. The report by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to the 
European Council in Lisbon on June 27, 1992, implicitly provided for the tasks of peace 
building and peacemaking, with implications for peacekeeping and enforcement:   
The CFSP should contribute to ensuring that the Unions 
external action is less reactive to events in the outside 
world, and more active in the pursuit of the interests of the 
Union and in the creation of a more favourable 
international environment.  This will enable the European 
Union to have an improved capacity to tackle problems at 
their roots in order to anticipate the outbreak of crises.  
Furthermore, the Union will be able to make clearer to third 
                                                 
42 Ibid., explanation of footnote reference 44, p. 175-6.  
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countries its own aims and interests, and to match more 
closely those parties expectations of the Union.43   
It was unfortunate for the EU, however, that the first test of its CFSP – the crisis 
in Yugoslavia  took place concurrently with the articulation of the new policy, and it 
failed miserably. Other EU efforts in crisis management have had greater success.  
The European Commission Humanitarian Organization (ECHO) has successfully 
sponsored projects in Bosnia as well as several African countries, such as the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Angola, Liberia, Sudan, Burundi, and Rwanda.  Working with the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), the EU mediated a settlement for the conflict in 
Congo/Brazzaville.44  Additionally, the EUs Balladur initiative (launched in 1994) has 
been credited with contributing significantly to the reduction of ethnic tensions in Eastern 
Europe.  This initiative set in motion a systematic program for Eastern European 
countries to resolve boundary and ethnic disputes between them and to embody the 
settlements in comprehensive bilateral treaties of friendship.45   
Due to the uncertainty as to where future crises will break out, one cannot list 
specifically any conflicts that may put on the EUs agenda.  The following factors 
specified in the Lisbon report could be taken into account when determining whether 
joint EU action should be taken:  the geographical proximity of a region or a country; 
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an important interest in the political and economic stability of a region or country; 
[and/or] the existence of threats to the security interests of the Union.46  Furthermore, 
the report specifies the EUs priorities in various regions and its possible objectives for 
managing conflict, with first priority given to Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans 
and the former Soviet republics.   
EC policy towards these countries might thus include 
peacebuilding, peacemaking and even peacekeeping and 
enforcement measures.  Second priority is given to the 
Maghreb and Middle East, where EC involvement seems to 
be restricted to peacebuilding and possibly peacemaking.47 
These guidelines from the report may be helpful in determining more specifically what 
types of conflict the EU will seek to manage under CESDP, in addition to clarifying the 
geographic scope of its aspirations.   
At present, the EU has not placed any geographic limit on its role other than the 
priorities identified in the Lisbon report and similar documents, which are somewhat 
dated.  In September 2000 French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin envisioned possible EU 
operations in Africa.48 Based on the EUs previous and continuing involvement in the 
African continent, through ECHO and the mediation efforts in Congo/Brazzaville, this 
would not be a significant departure from current practice.  Some representatives of the 
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EU, however, have expressed more far-reaching aspirations.  In September 1999, the 
representative of Finland, speaking on behalf of the EUs 15 Member States at the World 
Health Organization (WHO) Regional Committee for Europe meeting in Florence, Italy, 
stated that the EU was fully committed to provide humanitarian assistance to the 
population of East Timor as soon as possible.49 It was not clear, however, exactly what 
such assistance would consist of. 
Jolyon Howorth states that, because of the global economic status of the EU and 
the fact that a majority of the EU member states were imperial powers at some point in 
their history, The Union can reasonably claim to have interests more or less 
worldwide[and] it is difficult for the Union to draw up geographical boundaries beyond 
which it might consider that it had no responsibility for the defence of human rights.50  
However, what the EU is interested in getting involved in may differ from what it can 
realistically do. In Howorths view, The realistic geographical limit is unlikely to extend 
much beyond the EUs near abroad:  The Caucasus and trans-Caucasus, the Middle East, 
Africa.51   This is significant due to the risk of disagreements with Russia about the 
Caucasus and trans-Caucasus.   
One can also speculate about the various roles that the EU might play by 
reviewing the roles that NATO has played in crisis management during the last ten years, 
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which largely reflect its involvement in the Balkans.  To meet the challenges posed by the 
crisis in Yugoslavia, from the war in Bosnia to the operations in Kosovo (to include the 
Allied Force air campaign and the Kosovo Force, known as KFOR), NATO had to be 
prepared to conduct the following missions, among others: supervision of heavy weapons 
depots in hostile territory, monitoring airspace, protecting UN (or other) humanitarian 
relief operations, enforcing no-fly zones, establishing safe areas, disarming militant 
factions, deterring renewed aggression, protecting civilians, and  at the extreme end of 
the forceful intervention spectrum  bombing air defenses and many other types of 
targets to compel the Belgrade regime to accept NATO and/or UN Security Council 
demands.  It is widely accepted that the likelihood of NATO having to defend the 
territories of its member states in the classic collective defense role has been fading 
while the requirement for crisis management has been growing.  NATO has moved 
beyond its core missions of defense and deterrence to take on new roles ranging from 
preventing and managing civil wars to monitoring arms control and disarmament 
agreements.52   
 The Petersberg tasks generally fall under the category of crisis management; 
certainly, when one considers NATOs role in “managing” the recent crisis in Kosovo, it 
becomes readily apparent that the most demanding Petersberg tasks could in some 
circumstances be more challenging to deal with than the traditional role of collective 
defense.  The magnitude of the latter challenge would depend, of course, on the identity 
of the aggressor.  Due to the uncertainty over the wide number of crises that could fall 
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under the EUs purview, the EUs role as stated in December 2000 at the European 
Council in Nice should be taken essentially at face value for now:  the European Union 
will be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks as defined in the Treaty on 
European Union: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.53   From the least to the most 
demanding Petersberg task of peace making (as witnessed in the 1998-99 Kosovo 
conflict), the EU intends to be prepared  in the long run.  What should not be 
disregarded or wasted is the value of NATOs expertise in this role:      
NATO has collective experience in crisis management.  Its consultative 
mechanisms, its military structures, its experience in the political control 
of military operations, its range of military capabilities, and its 
transatlantic membership  together these bring a combination of 
expertise, experience, and capability ... in support of a wide-range of 
conflict prevention and crisis management activities.54 
 
Particularly with respect to the military aspect of CESDP, in which the EU has 
no background, NATOs experience and guidance will be essential to the EUs 
capability to perform the so-called Petersberg tasks.  The EU certainly acknowledges 
this, notably in the arrangements for NATO-EU relations discussed in the fourth chapter.  
Crises are often unpredictable, complicated, costly and long-term.  Given the 
wide range of conflicts available for the EU to get involved in and its limited resources, 
it must develop criteria for engagement.  Priorities for intervention can thus be set to 
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determine what the initial involvement in a crisis will be, particularly when multiple 
crises break out at the same time.  For example, referring to humanitarian operations, 
David Tucker has suggested grouping engagement criteria under two headings:  
interventions that require fighting (in non-permissive environments) and those that do 
not (in permissive environments).  Due to the fact that operations in non-permissive 
environments significantly increase the risks for American lives, Tucker has argued, 
they should only be carried out when the pending tragedy is of historic proportions.55  
Tucker has delineated other possible guidelines for involvement, such as not intervening 
unless U.S. action forms part of a multilateral effort or intervening if it is necessary to 
persuade others to participate.   Indeed, the intrinsic significance of the crisis, the 
implications for U.S. interests, and the potential consequences of inaction are integral 
parts of the equation as well.   
Although Tuckers discussion of engagement criteria pertains to U.S. 
interventions, the same principle applies to the EU in that the EU needs to formulate its 
own guidelines.  In many cases, because of the common interests and values shared 
between the United States and Europe, the guidelines will most likely be quite similar.  
Either way, the EU needs a strategy of selective engagement to define when and where it 
will get involved.  At this juncture, it appears that its strategy consists of getting 
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involved where NATO as a whole is not engaged;56 but there needs to be more.  This 
is yet another area for joint NATO-EU cooperation, the subject of the next chapter.   
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III. THE EU’S MILITARY CAPABILITIES FOR CRISIS 
MANAGEMENT:  WHAT IT HAS AND WHAT IT NEEDS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The process of developing the military capabilities that the EU needs for CESDP 
begins logically with determining the types of operations the organization anticipates 
having to conduct.  The EU has described these operations in general terms as the 
Petersberg tasks, involving all aspects of crisis management.  This is perhaps as specific 
as the EUs leaders can be at present, considering the difficulty in predicting future crises.   
As was shown in the previous chapters discussion of what the Petersberg tasks could 
entail, the spectrum of projected missions is fairly broad, ranging from simple to 
complex.  Planning for the most demanding contingencies means developing the military 
capabilities for such contingencies as well. 
 The second step in the process towards acquiring the necessary military 
capabilities is determining what would be needed to conduct the anticipated operations.  
After this, the assets already in the inventories of the EU member states must be matched 
with the capabilities required.  Next, those assets that are needed but not available must 
be identified, leading to the fifth and final step:  acquiring the missing assets, or at least 
finding viable substitutes.  The EU is currently working through these steps as it develops 
its autonomous capability, as evidenced by the progress made particularly in the latest 
European Councils at Santa Maria da Feira (June 2000) and Nice (December 2000), and 
at the Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels (November 2000).   
34 
This chapter does not seek to provide solutions for the EU member states to 
develop the capabilities they need for CESDP.  Rather, it assesses the EUs ability  and 
perhaps more importantly, its political will  to acquire the capabilities and assets needed 
to conduct the envisioned operations to meet its military goals in addition to identifying 
and rectifying other shortfalls.  The generic capabilities and assets needed to conduct 
crisis management operations (or to accomplish the Petersberg tasks) are discussed in 
light of where the EU stands today in defining the capabilities and acquiring the assets it 
needs.  This leads naturally to an exploration of the EUs capability shortfalls and of the 
U.S.-European capability gap.   The chapter concludes with an overall assessment of 
the EUs capability   in military terms  to fulfill its CESDP aspirations. 
B. GENERAL CAPABILITIES NEEDED FOR THE PETERSBERG TASKS 
 What are the capabilities needed to conduct Petersberg task or crisis management 
operations?  Due to the wide range of missions covered by these terms, it is impossible to 
outline all the capabilities.   However, the better the EU manages to do this, the easier it 
will be to accomplish its goals.  United States Secretary of Defense William Cohen listed 
the general areas that need to be covered for crisis management, based on the NATO 
Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) guidance: deployability and mobility, sustainability 
and logistics, command and control information systems, effective engagement, and 
survivability of forces and infrastructure.  After all, Secretary Cohen said, these are 
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the types of forces the Alliance would need for any Article 5 or non-Article 5 
operation.57   
Granted, the capabilities called for by the lower end of crisis management tasks 
(such as peacekeeping) differ somewhat from those of the most difficult.  Peace making, 
which may involve combat actions like NATOs Operation Allied Force in the Kosovo 
conflict, often requires capabilities such as strike assets, precision-guided munitions, 
heavy air transport, electronic warfare systems, and aerial refueling.  However, even 
peacekeeping operations require more than is readily apparent  more than troops, 
vehicles and small arms.  Reliable and robust intelligence and communications are, for 
example, essential for any military operation, no matter who is involved. As David Yost, 
a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, points out, the forces of the EU member 
states involved in SFOR and KFOR still require U.S. assistance to carry out their 
missions in areas such as logistics and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture.  This includes 
technical intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities to suppress Serb interference, if 
necessary.58 Moreover, if peacekeepers have to be extracted from a particular country in 
an emergency situation, nearby reinforcements must be available along with augmented 
capabilities for C4ISR, close air support, electronic warfare and large-scale logistical 
movement.  Operations do not always go according to plan, so provisions must be made 
                                                 
57 Secretary of Defense William Cohen, in remarks as prepared for delivery at informal NATO 
Defense Ministerial Meeting on October 10, 2000. Available Online:  
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2000/s20001010-secdef.html. 
58 David Yost, The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union, Survival, vol. 42, no. 4 
(Winter 2000-01), p. 116. 
36 
in case they do not.   If the EU wants to achieve the autonomous capability it has set 
forth as its objective, it must develop forces in all these areas, and especially in the five 
categories that Secretary Cohen listed; yet the EU member states fall short in most, if not 
all, of them.     
1. Assets Needed to Match Capabilities  
 With a good list of capabilities, one can begin to put together the assets needed to 
realize those capabilities.  As noted above, given the complexity of peace enforcement 
operations, the basic requirements appear little different from those required to fight an 
all-out war.  The three components of any military operation are infrastructure, logistics, 
and forces.  Necessary infrastructure includes airfields, telecommunications 
installations, command, control and information systems, military headquarters, fuel 
pipelines and storage, radar warning and navigational aid installations, port installations, 
forward storage sites and support facilities for reinforcement forces.59  Logistics entails 
the storage, distribution and maintenance of equipment as well as the construction and 
operation of facilities and installations, and the means to move personnel.   Forces consist 
of all the land, air and maritime units needed to carry out and support the actual mission.   
Putting the various pieces together to create the desired capability is no simple task, 
particularly when there is such a wide range of operations that the EU wants to be 
prepared to conduct.  
                                                 
59 Bauwens and Reychler,  p. 124. 
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 Michael OHanlon, a defense analyst in the Foreign Policy Studies program at the 
Brookings Institution, has conducted an in-depth study of the military requirements for 
humanitarian interventions.  Although his study is directed toward U.S. military 
interventions, many of his findings can be applied to the EU for the purpose of estimating 
what would be required for the EU to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks.  He 
judges that most humanitarian operations require 20,000 to 60,000 uniformed personnel.  
Forces of that size are appropriate for interventions in most small to medium-size 
countries, assuming potentially hostile forces numbering in the thousands to low tens of 
thousands.60  This assessment is consistent with the EUs Headline Goal in terms of 
troop strength.  OHanlon also concludes that, while intervention in a small country is 
generally feasible, the intervening force must have transport, logistics, and rapid 
maneuver capabilities.  OHanlon offers an important caveat: armed units of the 
traditional sort, rather than designated peacekeeping forces, appear the right ones to take 
on these logistically challenging and militarily dangerous tasks.61    This has 
implications for decisions to send in UN peacekeeping troops as opposed to NATO or EU 
peacekeeping forces, for example.  
 In addition to examining the requirements for crisis management, OHanlon 
addresses the same questions that the EU must itself consider as it develops CESDP:  
what operations do intervening forces have to conduct to establish themselves in a 
violence-ridden country, ensure security for themselves, and restore stability and order?  
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If initial ceasefires are broken and stability collapses, what steps must then be taken to 
restore it?  It is in considering the steps needed to establish control in the various 
scenarios of intervention, as well as what might have to be done if plans go awry, that the 
importance of the various capabilities listed in the DCI guidance becomes apparent.  
Even if intervention takes place in a country where a ceasefire already exists, the 
peacekeepers must be able to defend themselves.  Nowhere was this more apparent than 
during the hostage crisis in the Bosnian war in 1995 when the Serbs captured 
approximately 375 Dutch UN peacekeepers.62   
 There is much more to an operation than simply deployable troops. For instance, 
to get the troops into the country, airlift may be required; and if heavy equipment is 
needed, sealift may be essential.  Are there airfields that can be used in safe locations?  
Are the ports accessible or must they be seized?  For sustainable operations, the 
minimum numbers will never work.  Reserves are absolutely necessary to allow for troop 
rotation and equipment failure.   A force must be large enough to provide for operations 
exceeding its original mandate. 
 This leads to the last point that must be emphasized from OHanlons study: exit 
strategies are critical.  It would be imprudent and irresponsible for a country or an 
organization such as NATO or the EU to intervene and pull out without addressing long-
term stability.  This undoubtedly lengthens the commitment to troubled regions, as 
indicated by the presence of SFOR and KFOR in the Balkans today; but it is vitally 
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important that the exit strategy be considered from the beginning. In some circumstances, 
without an exit strategy, an intervening force may as well not intervene at all.    Certainly, 
the EU is taking the various intricacies of crisis management operations into account; the 
question is how well (and how promptly) it will be able to master these intricacies.   
2. The EU’s Progress Towards Defining Capabilities/Acquiring Assets  
 With the declaration of its Headline Goal at Helsinki, the EU delineated the 
general capabilities it seeks to acquire:  a force that is rapidly deployable, self-sustaining, 
with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other 
combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements.63  With 
the help of NATO expertise, the EU built on the progress of the European Council at 
Santa Maria da Feira in June 2000 to specify more precisely the EUs needs in terms of 
military capabilities to meet the Headline Goal, which it has outlined in a capability 
catalogue.  From this capability catalog, the EU is generating a force catalogue to field 
all the requirements.   Based on a combination of assessments by Jolyon Howorth, 
François Heisbourg, and David Yost, it appears that Britain and France alone could 
establish the desired force.  However, while these two countries will undoubtedly provide 
a large portion of the assets, it is unrealistic to expect either (or both) of them to shoulder 
the burden for all the EU member states.   
                                                                                                                                                 
62 Tim Judah, The Serbs, History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (New Haven: Yale 
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 Just prior to the European Council at Nice in December 2000, the EU held a 
Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels on 20 November 2000, at which the 
member states announced their initial contributions towards the Headline Goal set by the 
Helsinki European Council.  Based on unofficial information derived from press releases, 
these initial contributions are listed in Table 1. It is also important to note that the EU has 
welcomed contributions from non-EU members (among the nine accession candidates 
and non-EU European NATO members).  No precise numerical information has been 
officially published on any of the contributions.  The Capabilities Commitment 
Conference resulted in a pool of assets that includes over 100,000 persons, approximately 
400 combat aircraft and 100 naval vessels. The EU has declared that these assets make it 
possible fully to satisfy the needs identified to carry out the different types of crisis 
management missions within the headline goal.64   It is significant, however, that while 
many of the EU countries can supply troops, they are unable to provide the necessary 
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EU Member Initial Contribution to Force Catalog 
United Kingdom 20,000 troops,* 72 combat aircraft,  
18 ships 
France 12,000 troops,** 70 combat aircraft, 2 AWACS,  
30 UAVs, warships (to include 1 carrier) 
Germany  13,500 -18,000 troops***  
Italy 6,000 troops 
Belgium 1,000 troops mechanized brigade; 1 F-16 
squadron, unspecified number of naval vessels 
Netherlands 5,000 troops 
Luxembourg 500 troops 
Sweden 2,000 troops 
Ireland 1,000 troops 
Greece 3,000 troops 
Spain 6,000 troops 
Portugal 1,000 troops 
Austria Unspecified number of troops 
Finland 2,000 troops 
Denmark NO CONTRIBUTION 
    TABLE 1 
*Conflicting press reports indicate that Britain will contribute from 12,500 
to 20,000.  In either case, these troops would primarily come from those 
committed to NATOs Rapid Reaction Corps.  Only 10,000 would be 
deployed at any given time.65 
**These troops would include armored forces, Foreign Legion forces, 
engineering teams, commandoes and gendarmes. 
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***Conflicting press reports indicate that Germany will contribute at least 
13,500 troops and perhaps as many as 18,000. 
 Despite the initial outlay of equipment and personnel toward the Headline Goal 
and the confidence that it will be met by 2003, the EU still needs to make progress in 
developing all the capabilities necessary for sustained, long-range operations.  The EU is 
well aware of this.  The conference identified a number of areas in which efforts will be 
made in upgrading existing assets, investment, development and coordination so as 
gradually to acquire or enhance the capabilities required for autonomous EU action.66  
Additionally, the EU member states made a reference at the Capabilities Commitment 
Conference to continuing their work beyond the Headline Goal target date of 2003 to 
achieve the collective capability goals that they had initially identified at Helsinki as 
necessary to be able to carry out the most demanding Petersberg tasks.  For these goals, 
they need    
to develop and coordinate monitoring and early warning 
military means;  - to open existing joint national 
headquarters to officers coming from other Member States; 
- to reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of existing 
European multinational forces; - to prepare the 
establishment of a European air transport command; - to 
increase the number of readily deployable troops; - and to 
enhance strategic sea lift capacity.67 
 The conference outlined two areas in particular in which the EU member states 
made the first steps towards improving their strategic capabilities:  C3 (Command, 
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Control and Communications) and intelligence.  In the area of C3, the EU member states 
offered a satisfactory number of national or multinational headquarters at strategic, 
operational, force and component levels,68 which will be taken into consideration along 
with possible access to NATO capabilities to ensure reliable command and control.  With 
respect to intelligence, in addition to the IMINT (imagery intelligence) capabilities at the 
Torrejon Satellite Center, various EU member states are willing to contribute some of 
their resources to assist the EU in analyzing and monitoring situations; however, they 
also noted that this area constitutes a significant weak link for future operations.  Indeed,  
serious efforts would be necessary in this area in order for the [European] Union to have 
more strategic intelligence at its disposal in the future.69  Although the capabilities 
commitment declaration mentioned strategic air and naval transport, it did so only to 
acknowledge that improvements in this area are necessary to conduct the most difficult 
crisis management operations.    
In addition to committing specific assets at the conference, the EU member states 
committed themselves to various projects within their armed forces to improve their 
collective capabilities.  In an effort to prepare for potential crisis managment operations, 
these projects include developing resources for search and rescue operations and for 
defense against ground-to-ground missiles, plus precision weapons, logisitic support and 
simulation tools.  As evidence of their commitment to achieving such improvements, 
some of the EU members cited their efforts in restructuring some of the European defense 
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industries as well as their participation in certain projects that may help significantly 
improve European capabilities.  These projects include Future Large Aircraft  (Airbus A 
400M), sea transport vessels, and Troop Transport Helicopters (NH 90).  Moreover, some 
of the EU members announced their intention to acquire equipment to improve the 
safety and efficiency of military action while some committed themselves to improving 
the EUs guaranteed access to satellite imaging, thanks in particular to the development 
of new optical and radar satellite equipment (Helios II, SAR Lupe and Cosmos 
Skymed).70  What was missing, however, among these expressions of ambitious 
intentions and commitments was any reference to the need for increased defense 
spending.  Without such spending, real progress is unlikely.     Apparently because 
the EU member states are aware of the need to hold each other accountable to their 
commitments, the conference established an evaluation mechanism, approved at the 
European Council at Nice in December 2000, to monitor the progress made toward 
reaching the Headline Goal.   The review mechanism can be compared to the 
convergence criteria, by which states seeking accession to the EU can work towards 
satisfying the necessary guidelines set by the EU for membership.  The review process 
will involve EU member state and NATO experts, through expert groups based on the 
Headline Task Force/Headline Task Force Plus (HTF/HTF Plus) formats, with the 
assistance of the EU Military Staff (EUMS), evaluating and reviewing the capability 
goals and progress towards fulfilling the commitments made.  Periodic reports will be 
made to the EU's Military Committee, which will then draft any necessary 
                                                 
70 Ibid., par.5. 
45 
recommendations for the Political and Security Committee (PSC).  During the evaluation 
process, the capability goals will be modified as necessary, according to changing 
circumstances.  Additionally, the mechanism will seek to achieve consistency between 
the commitments made to the EU and, for the countries concerned, force goals agreed to 
in the context of NATO defense planning or the Partnership for Peace Planning and 
Review Process (PARP).  Maintaining transparency and cooperation in NATO is 
extremely important for several reasons, not least of which is the desire to avoid 
duplication of effort and to mutually reinforce the EUs capability goals with NATOs 
Defense Capabilities Initiative (for EU members that are also in NATO).71 
C. THE EU’S SHORTFALLS AND THE U.S.-EUROPEAN CAPABIILTIES 
GAP 
 It is not surprising that the EU is making concerted efforts to improve its 
capabilities in cooperation with NATO.  In fact, it is a positive step, for the Europeans in 
general  whether part of NATO and/or the EU  suffer from significant military 
shortfalls, particularly compared to the United States.  The organizations involved in 
recent years in reviewing and assessing Europes requirements for military capabilities 
include:  the WEU, with its Audit of Assets and Capabilities for European Crisis 
Management Operations, which reported in November 1999; NATO, with its Defense 
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Capabilities Initiative (DCI),72 which commenced in April 1999; the EU interim Military 
Body (iMB) Headline Goal Task Force (HGTF);73 and the EU-NATO Ad Hoc Working 
Group on collective capabilities (which commenced on July 28, 2000).74    Additionally, 
during its presidency of the WEU and the EU in the latter half of 2000, France convened 
a meeting of the EU defense ministers in September 2000 to examine the requirements of 
the various crisis scenarios that the EU could face. This meeting was followed in 
November 2000 by the Capabilities Commitment Conference discussed above.  Some 
experts and officials have argued that the EU and NATO should streamline their efforts 
and create one, or at most two, organizations to work on the assessment of requirements 
together.   
On a positive note, two of the entities mentioned at least involve coordinated 
efforts between the EU and NATO.  The EU-NATO Ad Hoc Working Group actually 
consists of four groups which provide for coordination between the EU and NATO in the 
following areas:  security issues, capabilities goals, procedures for enabling EU access to 
NATO assets and capabilities, and the definition of permanent arrangements for EU-
NATO consultation.75  The NATO team working on the DCI has also aimed to 
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coordinate its work with the EUs work on reaching the Headline Goal.    With the large 
strides that the Europeans need to make to narrow the capabilities gap with the United 
States, efforts to address the shortfalls should not be inefficient or redundant.   
Any discussion of European military capabilities would be incomplete without 
examining the U.S.-European capabilities gap.  David Yost has described the shortfalls 
as an aggregate of many gaps,76 to include those in technology, investment and 
procurement.  Ultimately, all of them add up to a marked U.S. superiority, both 
quantitative and qualitative, in the ability to conduct military operations and manage 
crises.  The American advantages include strategic mobility assets (such as aerial 
refueling and air transport), surface ships and submarines, precision-strike munitions, 
electronic warfare, power projection (in the sense of long-range air and missile strikes), 
and  C4ISR.77   
 That the Europeans Allies are lacking in the areas of deployability, sustainability 
and logistics is not a surprise when one considers their defensive posture from 1950 to 
1990.  They did not develop a capability for force projection, as the United States did, 
because there was no need.  Yet, despite the fact that the Cold War ended over ten years 
ago, they have yet to adapt their force structures to the new geostrategic environment in 
which collective defense preparedness has become less urgent than peacekeeping, peace 
making, humanitarian assistance, and other such crisis management tasks.  While the 
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Europeans in the past were primarily only concerned with territorial defense, now they 
must be prepared to go to the crisis  a completely different problem to tackle.   
In the post-Cold War era, the Gulf War in 1990-1991 was the first combat 
demonstration of the significant capabilities gaps between the United States and its 
European Allies, particularly in the areas of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, 
precision attack, transport and force protection.78  Eight years later in 1999, and even 
today, the situation has shown no improvement.  While the example of Operation Allied 
Force in the Kosovo conflict cannot be considered a completely accurate depiction of 
how far the Europeans have fallen behind, due to the fact that the campaign was fought 
according to U.S. designs and played to U.S. advantages (as with the Gulf War), it was 
nevertheless a clear indication of what the Europeans were (and still are) not capable of 
doing.    The United States delivered 80% of the weapons and was responsible for 90% of 
the air-to-air refueling capability.  Additionally, the United States was alone, or almost 
alone, in providing offensive electronic warfare, airborne command and control, all-
weather precision guided munitions and mobile target acquisition.  For every strike sortie 
conducted by a European aircraft, three U.S. support aircraft were needed.79   
One of the most significant problems revealed by the Kosovo campaign, which 
was a result of the capabilities gap between the United States and its European Allies, 
was that of interoperability and intelligence.  The United States was responsible for 
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supplying 95% of the intelligence support.80  Yet, passing pertinent intelligence to the 
Allies was often cumbersome and slow as a result of the process of obtaining clearance 
for releasing the information.  The United States also clearly holds the advantage in 
strategic intelligence assets.  The only real capability in Europe now resides in the Helios 
1 spy satellite held jointly by France, Spain and Italy.81   However, the Germans, who 
were dissatisfied with the satellite imagery that the United States provided during the 
Kosovo conflict, are reportedly discussing investment in a German radar satellite called 
SAR/LUPE.82  In terms of theater-reconnaissance capability, the United States is far 
better equipped than its European Allies with assets such as the RC-135 Rivet Joint, U-2 
reconnaissance planes, JSTARS ground-surveillance aircraft, and unmanned aerial 
vehicles such as Predator and Hunter.    
Lack of secure communications was also a significant obstacle to the transfer of 
operational and intelligence information among the Allies.  This posed a particular threat 
to force protection.  As James Thomas points out, the lack of secure, interoperable 
aircraft communications and anti-jam radios meant that command-and-control aircraft 
and other Allied planes had to pass information in the clear, thereby badly compromising 
operational security.83  Additionally, the lack of interoperability between the primary 
U.S. secure messaging system (the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, or 
SIPRNET) and NATOs system (known as the Crisis Response Operations NATO 
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Operating System, or CRONOS) inhibited operational effectiveness.  So much of the 
Kosovo effort relied on web-based technologies, e-mail and video-conferencing, due to 
the fact that this was the way the United States forces operated, that managing the use of 
such technologies in coordination with the other allies in the conflict was extremely 
challenging.    
Even if the EU members want an EU-only capability independent of the United 
States and not necessarily interoperable with U.S. systems, an improved C4ISR 
architecture would pay large dividends by enabling them to conduct the most demanding 
crisis management tasks more effectively.  The benefit of being able to operate more 
smoothly with U.S. forces in coalition efforts, which in reality is what the Europeans will 
most likely find themselves doing for the foreseeable future, makes improved and 
interoperable C4ISR that much more important.   Even without the United States, 
however, the EU feels it must develop its own capabilities for intelligence  for providing 
indications and warning to its troops and accurate, timely assessments to the operators 
and decision-makers alike; and the countries involved must be willing to share that 
intelligence among themselves  a prospect that has proven to be challenging thus far.   
 Before the EU can hope to rectify the situation it is in today, it will need to 
address the reasons why it has fallen so far behind.  Certainly, the defensive, Cold War 
mentality is largely responsible, particularly with the United States poised to fight all the 
major battles.  On the basis of declared policy, the EU is working to change this 
mentality, although it is obvious that the force structures in many of the European Union 
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countries do not reflect this.   It remains true that, despite professed desires for autonomy, 
the presence and power of the United States still constitute a crutch on which the 
Europeans lean  even the French.   
Two other causes have played into the U.S.-European capabilities gap, however: 
reduced defense spending and reliance on conscript armies.   In fact, declining defense 
budgets in many EU countries are cited as one of the main sources of the capabilities gap. 
Not surprisingly, the Europeans have traditionally received large amounts of criticism for 
this, particularly from U.S. officials frustrated with America footing the majority of the 
bill for certain crisis operations in Europe.84   Although there are some difficulties in 
comparing defense budgets due to variations from country to country as to the structure 
and content of such budgets, general trends can nevertheless be drawn from a 
comparison.  The United States spends approximately $285 billion per year on defense, 
or 3.2 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), compared to the EU, which spends 
(collectively) approximately $165 billion per year, or 2.1 percent of its combined  GDP.85  
Moreover, Americas 3.2 percent is spent more efficiently than the 2.1 percent in Europe, 
with a greater proportion on procurement.  François Heisbourg points out that the 
Europeans should be able to achieve 60% of the U.S. capability since their defense 
budget is 60% what the United States spends; yet, They are probably below 10% in the 
realm of strategic reconnaissance and theatre-level C4ISR, at substantially less than 20% 
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in airlift capacity (by volume and tonnage), and possibly less than 10% in terms of 
precision-guided air-deliverable ordnance.86  Europeans have spent more of their 
defense budgets on personnel and less on research and development. Not counting 
quantity of systems, this translates into a U.S. qualitative advantage. 
Additionally, the Europeans traditional reliance on conscript armies has drawn 
criticism from the United States, with Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands being the 
notable exceptions among the European states.  As a result, money that could go toward 
procurement is spent on the high costs of short-term conscripts, training, pensions and 
infrastructure. In the high technology environment in which wars are fought and crises 
are managed today, forces need to be professional.  As John Hulsman, a senior policy 
analyst at the Heritage Foundation, points out, The demands of warfare in this new 
century will require a commitment to extensive training that can only be expected of 
professionals.87 Fortunately, France has now almost completed its transition to an all-
professional armed force.  Italy, Portugal, and Spain are also moving in the same 
direction.  By no means is the transition to an all-professional force an easy task.  Indeed, 
it has been a more expensive venture for the French than they thought it would be, 
despite the reduction in overall force size.  Such a transition should nonetheless assist 
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greatly in improving operational flexibility and equipment modernization for these 
states.88 
D. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF EU’S MILITARY CAPABILITY 
Closing the capabilities gap is no small matter.  As Jolyon Howorth states, The 
shortfall in European military capacity is widely perceived, in Europe and in the United 
States, as the major priority to be addressed by the Europeans.89  The bottom line for the 
Europeans in improving their military capabilities is that they will not be able to achieve 
their objectives if they do not increase their defense budgets, or worse, if they keep 
decreasing them.   This applies to the European countries in general, both the European 
NATO countries and the EU member states.  General Wesley Clark, former NATO 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and former Commander of the U.S. 
European Command (CINCEUR), has stated, It is time to halt the reduction of resources 
dedicated to defense  the so-called peace dividend  and face up to the reality that in this 
still dangerous world, security never comes cheap.90   The EU knows this in theory, but 
its practice has to date been a different story.  It will politically difficult in all of the EU 
countries to increase defense spending, particularly in this time of relative peace.  As the 
embarrassment of Kosovo falls further into the background, the task will not get any 
easier; but it must be done if the EU truly wants its autonomous capacity. 
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Meeting the Headline Goal is but one baby step towards achieving forces 
capable of conducting the full spectrum of Petersberg tasks.   As David Yost points out, 
The EUs headline goal for 2003 is cast in such broad terms that the member states are 
almost certain to declare victory in meeting it.91  It was established as the maximum that 
could gain consensus among the members.  Its proponents hope that it will generate the 
momentum needed for creating a greater military capability in the long-term.  
According to Jolyon Howorths description of the size of the force envisioned by 
experts when the Headline Goal is actually met, the numbers do not look promising.  
Using the general rule of thumb that one third of the forces are used for logistics, one 
third for combat, and one third for combat support, and assuming provisions must be 
made for troop rotation and replacement, the EU would really need to have at least 
180,000-200,000 ground forces.92  The air forces would need to consist of 300 combat 
aircraft (organized into eight or nine wings) with 180 support aircraft, and the naval 
forces would need at least three task groups with 20 frigates each, or one carrier group 
with 15 frigates.93  In an analysis consistent with Howorths assessments, François 
Heisbourg states that with 60,000 troops, which would include both logistic and combat 
support units, only 20,000 troops would be left to conduct the actual mission.  Such a 
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fighting force, he argues, could not be deployed for the most demanding Petersberg 
tasks,94 no matter what the EU declared at Helsinki.  
Once again, it comes down to resources and how much effort the EU member 
states are willing to make to organize a serious military capacity for crisis management 
operations.   In defining the Headline Goal, the EU perhaps purposely made the objective 
achievable, to create a sense of progress toward the ultimate goal.  The many institutional 
structures, ad hoc working groups and committees that have been established likewise 
contribute to this sense of progress.  However, the hard road lies just ahead in translating 
political will, assuming it exists, into increased defense budgets to obtain the air 
transport, air-to-air refueling, airborne command and control, offensive electronic 
warfare, and surveillance and reconnaissance and other assets that the EU member states 
need.   
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IV. THE IMPACT OF THE EU’S EMERGING SECURITY ROLE 
ON NATO 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Common European Security and Defense Policy marks a new step in 
European integration  one that comes with significant challenges and implications for 
the U.S. relationship with the European Union.  As CESDP comes to life, the EU will 
have to develop a cohesive European security culture that is a vital ingredient not only 
in the decision-making process itself, but also in ensuring that practical implementation 
will happen as foreseen.95   In other words, the EUs member states need to look past 
and overcome their differences to pursue this common goal, and the progress report thus 
far is somewhat promising.  The accomplishments of the European Council Meetings at 
Cologne (June 1999) and Helsinki (December 1999) were hailed as illustrations of a 
remarkable consensus among the 15 member states more significant than even such 
critical initiatives as the European Monetary Union.   Nevertheless, the potential for 
future deadlock exists because the various member states hold different views on how 
CESDP should be implemented.  One of the most contentious issues  and certainly the 
one most critical to the United States  revolves around how CESDP will affect the EUs 
relationship with NATO.  As Javier Solana observed in a speech in Berlin in November 
2000: 
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The development of the ESDP inevitably has evoked 
questions about the EUs relationship with NATO.  We 
have responded to these questions from the very beginning:  
The EU is not in the business of collective defence.  Nor is 
it in the business of creating a European army.  The 
creation of a European Security and Defense Policy is 
aimed at strengthening, not weakening transatlantic ties.96   
Unfortunately, not everyone in Europe or the United States agrees. 
This chapter explores the impact of the EUs emerging security role on NATO by 
first providing an overview of the political-military structures that the EU has put in place 
(or will put in place) for coordination with NATO.  The proposed modalities for 
discussions with EU candidate states and non-EU European NATO members are also 
reviewed.  Given this understanding of how the EU intends to work with NATO (at least 
for the present), the nature of the prospective relationship between the EU and NATO is 
assessed.  The two main opposing views of the impact that CESDP will have on NATO 
are then analyzed.  The chapter concludes by presenting the United States view of 
CESDP, to include the positive aspects as well as some concerns of the United States.  
B. POLITICAL-MILITARY STRUCTURES FOR INTERACTION 
BETWEEN NATO AND EU  
 The Presidency Report on ESDP of 4 December 2000 stressed the EUs 
recognition of NATOs primary role in collective defense and further emphasized that 
ESDP will also lead to a genuine strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in the 
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management of crises with due regard for the two organisations' decision-making 
autonomy.  Establishing a permanent and effective EU-NATO relationship in the 
beginning, developmental stages of CESDP is extremely significant, and the EU has 
clearly made a concerted effort towards this end.  The precise arrangements for 
transparency, dialogue and cooperation between the EU and NATO have yet to be 
worked out in detail.  The EU proposals for these arrangements are contained in Annex 
VII to the Presidency Report on ESDP, titled Standing Arrangements for Consultation 
and Cooperation Between the EU and NATO.   In it, the general guiding principles of 
the relationship are outlined, followed by the procedures for consultation both during and 
outside times of crisis.  The appendix to this annex, Annex to the Permanent 
Arrangements on EU/NATO Consultation and Cooperation on the Implementation of 
Paragraph 10 of the Washington Communique, specifically deals with the modalities for 
EU access to NATOs planning capabilities and pre-identified assets and capabilities.97   
 Cooperation between the two organizations has already taken place, 
primarily in the form of meetings and the establishment of regular dialogue 
between the two organizations at various levels.  At the highest level, Javier 
Solana (the EU Councils Secretary-General and also the EUs High 
Representative for CFSP) and Lord Robertson (NATOs Secretary General) have 
met and will continue to do so.  Significantly, the two Secretaries-General 
concluded an Interim Security Agreement that encouraged the development of 
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[EU-NATO] relations by authorising initial exchanges of documents and opened 
the way to a definitive arrangement between the European Union and NATO.98  
Regular meetings have also started at the senior levels of the two organizations 
(the EUs Political and Security Committee and the North Atlantic Council in 
Permanent Session).  The first two such meetings were held on 19 September and 
9 November 2000.  Additionally, the European Council at Santa Maria da Feira 
(June 2000) established four ad hoc EU/NATO working groups to discuss issues 
of security, capabilities, the process of EU access to NATO assets and structures, 
and definitions of permanent agreements.   
Significant interaction has taken place, particularly in the area of developing the 
EUs military capabilities.  In fact, NATOs military expertise assisted greatly in 
developing the EUs Capabilities Catalogue.  As General Joseph Ralston, Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe, pointed out, 
As the only multinational headquarters which has direct 
experience of such operations, SHAPE [Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] was closely involved 
in the design of the Headline Goal Catalogue.  Experts 
from all NATO nations in SHAPE worked alongside 
experts from the EU throughout the summer and early 
autumn to provide technical advice.99  
Such interaction is vitally important and will  if all goes as planned  continue.  
One of the ad hoc groups set up by the Feira European Council, the group on EU/NATO 
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capabilities, intends to ensure that EU and NATO capabilities develop consistently in 
those areas where they overlap (especially those that fall under the overall EU headline 
goal and NATOs DCI); this will certainly benefit both organizations.   
One of the aspects of the NATO-EU relationship that is perhaps most 
critical to a successful CESDP is, to employ the EUs terms, guaranteed 
permanent access to NATOs planning capabilities and the presumption of 
availability of pre-identified [NATO] assets and capabilities.100  The EU has 
emphasized this on several occasions.  Specifically, the Presidency Report on 
ESDP report stated:   
The European Union will call on NATO for operational 
planning of any operation using NATO assets and 
capabilities. When the Union examines options with a view 
to an operation, the establishing of its strategic military 
options could involve a contribution by NATO's planning 
capabilities. The EU would stress the importance of 
appropriate provisions giving those who so wish access to 
Alliance structures in order, when necessary, to facilitate 
effective participation by all Member States in EU-led 
operations which make use of NATO assets and 
capabilities.101 
 At this point, the arrangements set forth in the appendix to Annex VII (referred to 
above) are only suggestions.  First of all, the EU wants guaranteed access to NATOs 
planning capabilities.  Second, in a case where an EU-led operation calls for NATO 
assets, the appendix lays out a procedure whereby certain pre-identified assets and 
capabilities (which have yet to be determined) will be placed at the disposal of the EU.   
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Third, with respect to command and control, Discussions will take place between 
experts from the EU and the Alliance with a view to identifying a series of possible 
options for the choice of all or part of a chain of command (operation commanders, force 
commanders, unit commanders and associated Military Staff elements).102 Many of the 
points made in this appendix, however, still need to be validated by the military 
committees of both organizations and approved by the EU and NATO. 
Each of the three permanent institutions set up for ESDP  the Political and 
Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Staff (EUMS), and the EU Military 
Committee (EUMC)  has tasks assigned specifically for coordination with NATO.  For 
example, the PSC plays a major role in enhancing consultations, in particular with 
NATO and the third States involved.103 The EU Military Committee (EUMC), which 
provides military advice and makes recommendations to the PSC, will assess the 
implications of particular crises with respect to EU relations to third parties and other 
organizations, including NATO.     
Finally, the EU Military Staff (EUMS), which serves as the link between 
the EUMC and the EUs military force, is charged with establishing permanent 
relations with NATO according to the document on EU/NATO Permanent 
Relations.  As part of its duties, the EUMS contributes to the process of 
elaboration, assessment and review of the capability goals taking into account the 
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need, for those Member States concerned, to ensure coherence with NATOs 
Defence Planning Process (DPP) and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) of 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in accordance with agreed procedures.104   It also  
coordinates the procedures with national and multinational 
HQs including those NATO HQs available to the EU, 
ensuring, as far as possible, compatibility with NATO 
procedures . . . [and] plans, conducts and evaluates the 
military aspect of the EU's crisis management procedures, 
including the exercising of EU/NATO procedures.105 
Apart from the purely NATO-EU relationship, arrangements have also been made 
to allow for non-EU European NATO members and EU accession candidates to 
participate in the EUs military crisis management.  In fact, the relations between 
the EUMC and NATO will be defined in the document on EU/NATO permanent 
relations, while the relations between the EUMC and non-EU European NATO 
members are defined in the document on the EUs permanent relations with third 
countries.106   There is undoubtedly going to be some duplication and overlap in 
EU arrangements with non-EU European NATO members.  These arrangements 
include regular and substantive dialogue in ministerial meetings and meetings of 
military experts.  One of these ministerial meetings took place following the 
Capabilities Commitment Conference to discuss the participation of these 
countries and their assets in any future EU-led operations.  While the EU has 
made it clear that it welcomes contributions from non-member states, the process 
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of non-member participation in decision-making needs to be clarified.  This could 
prove to be quite challenging, for the EU naturally insists that its decision-making 
authority must be respected; but other states will also likely insist that they 
participate in the decision-making process when their assets are being used.   
Despite General Ralstons optimism for the NATO-EU relationship, he 
summarized the future challenges well: 
This joint work [referring to SHAPEs role in assisting the 
EU] has demonstrated that SHAPE involvement and an 
operational link to the alliance need not undermine EU 
autonomous decision-making.  [But] we are only at the 
beginning of a long process.  Many difficult decisions lie 
ahead for all nations that will contribute forces to EU 
operations particularly in managing increasing demands on 
the finite pool of national armed forces.  The forces that 
constitute the EU Headline Goal Catalogue will need to be 
trained, exercised and developed in a way that does not 
conflict with or undermine existing commitments.  Therein 
lies the real challenge.107   
In particular, General Ralston  along with other NATO officials  may be 
concerned about a potential conflict with NATOs existing commitments.  Certain 
British units, for example, are earmarked for the EUs Rapid Reaction Force, 
NATOs Rapid Reaction Corps and Britains own military operations.  This 
triple-hatted situation makes it all the more necessary to establish clear 
procedures on the use of the forces.  The EU and NATO hope to avoid any 
conflicts through the structures for regular dialogue and transparency that they 
have set up.   
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Due to the experience and assets NATO has to conduct crisis management 
operations, a strong NATO-EU relationship is indispensable to the success of 
CESDP.  The EU will have to rely on this experience for the near term in 
developing its new security role.  There are other reasons, too, why NATO and 
the EU must develop mutual transparency and cooperate effectively.  For the 
eleven NATO countries that are also in the EU, their efforts to improve their 
military forces in accordance with the EU headline and collective capability goals 
and those they devote to NATOs DCI will be mutually reinforcing.    
To avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, the two organizations must 
communicate with each other.  For the EU, this means relying on  
technical data emanating from existing NATO mechanisms 
such as the Defence Planning Process and the Planning and 
Review Process (PARP). Recourse to these sources would 
be had, with the support of the EU Military Staff (EUMS), 
via consultations between experts in a working group set up 
on the same model as that which operated for the drawing 
up of the capabilities catalogue (HTF Plus).108  
 
The progress that has been made thus far  such as the NAC meetings with the 
EUs PSC, the joint EU-NATO consultations on force and capability 
requirements for the EU Headline Goal, and interim security agreements allowing 
the exchange of classified material  must be sustained and built upon.109   
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C. OPPOSING VIEWS OF THE IMPACT OF CESDP ON THE TRANS-
ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP 
 The Common European Security and Defense Policy, according to government 
leaders in Europe and the United States, is officially intended to strengthen the trans-
Atlantic ties.  It is meant to benefit both NATO and the EU and to strengthen European 
security. As William Cohen, then Secretary of Defense, emphasized in October 2000, 
flexibility on both sides is essential: 
The process of developing [NATO and the EUs] new 
relationship has only just begun, and we realize it will take 
time to complete.  NATO can and should be flexible and 
generous in establishing such a relationship.  Equally, the 
EU  a strong, confident, and vibrant institution that has 
accomplished so much in bringing Europeans toward an 
ever closer union in so many areas  can and should be 
flexible and generous in its approach.110  
 While both NATO and the EU recognize this in theory, the key will be whether 
they do so in practice.  Two strong and opposing views have emerged on CESDP and the 
impact it will have on NATO.  One view is that CESDP will undermine the Alliance and 
adversely affect the trans-Atlantic relationship; and the other view, which is the official 
position of NATO and the EU, is that ESDP will strengthen the trans-Atlantic ties.   
Advocates of both views can be found among political, diplomatic and military officials 
and experts on both sides of the Atlantic.  Ultimately, the end result will depend on how 
the NATO-EU relationship develops over the next few years.   
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Before analyzing these two opposing views, it is important to consider the 
differences of opinion on this subject among the European states  the United Kingdom 
and France, in particular.  The EU can be divided into two general camps:  the French-led 
Europeanists and the British-led Atlanticists.  For France, CESDP comes first and the 
Europeans must be prepared to act autonomously, independent of the United States.  
While consensus on this approach is more widely shared in France than in any other EU 
country, politicians supportive of this outlook can be found in Belgium, Germany, and 
other countries.  For Britain, and the other states allied with its position (such as the 
Netherlands and Portugal), the trans-Atlantic ties come first and CESDP is merely a 
vehicle to provide the EU with improved capabilities for crisis management and other 
Petersberg tasks, should the United States choose not to participate in particular 
contingencies.  The Europeanist-Atlanticist contention is significant not least because it 
pits France against Britain; and as Jolyon Howorth points out, the fate of CESDP at the 
turn of the millennium lay largely in the hands of the British and the French.111 They 
have been the leaders in the initiative since the December 1998 St. Malo declaration.   
Moreover, these two countries will be responsible for providing a significant portion of 
the EUs military capability.    
Up until December 2000, one example of the differences between the French and 
the British concerned operational planning.  The British (and other NATO countries, 
including the United States) wanted planning to be conducted at SHAPE, whereas the 
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French wanted a separate EU planning body independent of SHAPE.112  This should not 
have come as a surprise since the French have not participated in NATOs defense 
planning, the core issue within the integrated military structure, since 1966. However, a 
separate EU defense planning structure could involve a significant duplication of 
resources and effort and undermine NATOs political cohesion and the NATO-EU 
relationship.  While observers on both sides of the Atlantic have suggested that a motive 
inspiring many of the French has been to weaken U.S. influence in Europe, the French 
would describe their objectives in more positive terms:  reducing the EUs dependence on 
U.S. political leadership and military capabilities, enabling the EU to define its own 
policies in international security, and increasing the EUs influence in international 
politics.   In December 2000, the French withdrew their insistence on separate EU and 
NATO defense planning structures and endorsed the mechanisms outlined in the Nice 
Presidency Report on CESDP.  Turkey is now blocking the consensus in NATO for 
allowing the EU access to NATOs planning capabilities.113   
In Britain, the issue of ESDP and a European defense force has become a hot 
political topic.  British Prime Minister Tony Blair supports it with great conviction.  The 
nay-sayers, on the other hand, are led by William Hague and the Conservatives in 
Parliament.  In fact, William Hague has indicated that a Conservative government would 
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pull British troops out of the EU force.114  This would be an enormous setback to 
CESDP.  Three arguments in the British debate against what some are calling a 
European army are as follows:  first, it risks causing damage to NATO; second, British 
forces are already overstretched with existing commitments across the globe; and third, 
Britain does not want to relinquish control over its forces to the EU.  Other concerns 
include the impact that an EU force could have on the special intelligence-sharing 
relationship between the United States and Britain, especially if the United States began 
refusing to share sensitive intelligence with the British for fear that it would end up in the 
hands of other Europeans.  The position of Sir John Weston, former British ambassador 
to the Alliance, is representative of many who fear that the EU Rapid Reaction Force will 
undermine NATO.  According to Weston, The present course ... leads inexorably to the 
progressive downgrading and deconstruction of NATO as the main western instrument of 
collective defense and security and to attenuation of the Washington Treaty as the main 
legal expression of transatlantic unity.115   Weston has also argued that it makes no 
sense for two multinational organizations to do the same thing.   
 The plans for building EU-NATO transparency certainly have many wrinkles that 
will not be ironed out so easily; and it is perhaps the recognition of these wrinkles that 
underlies the pessimism expressed in some quarters over the NATO-EU relationship.  For 
instance, the dispute between the British and the French over the defense planning 
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arrangements was a serious concern for the other EU members as well as NATO; but the 
other difficulties involve countries that are non-EU European NATO states.  Turkey is 
concerned about the EUs military ambitions due to its exclusion from the EU club.  As 
noted above, in December 2000, Turkey blocked a U.S.-backed initiative for NATOs 
planning facilities to be made available automatically to the EU for EU-led operations.  
Turkey has offered to lift its veto if the EU allows it to have a voice in decisions on EU-
led military actions taken in the region, including the Balkans and the Mediterranean; but 
the EU leaders insist that they cannot risk undermining the political legitimacy of their 
new defense role by allowing Turkey, a non-EU state, to have what amounts to a seat in 
their military councils.116 
The United States is seeking a solution to the disagreement and, with good cause, 
is trying to convince the EU that it needs to be more flexible and inclusive in its plans for 
a military force if it wants to work more closely with Turkey and the other non-EU 
European NATO members.  Simply from the standpoint of providing assets, these other 
countries have a lot to offer the EU force if the EU is willing to let them participate to the 
degree that they want.  This issue is but one of the challenges ahead for the EU, but it 
shows that it will require significant give and take on both sides if a good working 
relationship is to be established.   
Many people in NATO countries welcome greater European military cooperation 
only within NATO, and others are skeptical about CESDPs prospects for success.  Some 
critics say that the projected gains in European military capability may be too meager to 
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justify the risk of creating a potential rival to NATO.  In the worst case, if the EU does 
not develop its force, but tears the Alliance apart in the process of trying, security 
throughout the Euro-Atlantic region will be at risk.  John Hamre, former U.S. deputy 
defense secretary and currently the head of the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, talked at length during a NATO-EU conference about the problem of declining 
European defense budgets and lack of funding.  He said, quite bluntly, that without 
spending more on defense, the failure of the European Union force could mean the end of 
NATO: 
The Europeans have galvanized themselves around some 
very concrete goals and I for one think it is a good thing, 
[Hamre] said.  But I do believe strongly that if the 
European defense policy fails at this stage it will be the 
death of NATO.  Failure of the European force would 
convince America once and for all that its burdens are 
unending, Hamre said.  If Europe cannot get its act 
together  I personally believe the United States would 
shed itself of this burden.117 
Many Europeans do in fact fear that the United States will disengage from 
Europe.  The reaction to initial announcements from newly elected President Bush that he 
intends to withdraw U.S. forces from the Balkans was one of grave concern.  According 
to senior NATO generals, United Nations officials, and Western diplomats,   
the American role in Kosovo is as crucial now as ever, and 
they assert that  Bushs expressed desire to pull 
American troops out of the Balkans is both ill-timed and 
damaging to Western goals in the region.  If the 
Americans should suddenly withdraw or downgrade their 
commitment in a big way, the implications would be severe 
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for the NATO alliance, for regional stability, relations with 
Russia and the behavior of the ethnic Albanian Kosovars as 
well.118 
Some Europeans believe that small-scale crises might become all-out wars if the United 
States is not involved. While this belief may be a bit extreme, particularly in light of the 
prevailing U.S. consensus that Europe is too vital an interest for the United States to 
disengage from, it underscores the fact that the European Union still depends ultimately 
on the United States to underwrite security throughout the Euro-Atlantic region.    
 Many who are optimistic about the effect that CESDP will have on trans-Atlantic 
ties emphasize that, even though not all the groundwork for CESDP has been laid, the 
concept of a better-equipped and more capable European Union working together with 
NATO and the United States makes sense. Lord Robertson pointed out that Frankly, if it 
[ESDP] were to undermine or endanger the North Atlantic Alliance, I as Secretary 
General of NATO would have nothing to do with it.119 In a Senate hearing before the 
Subcommittee on European Affairs in March 1999, Anthony Wayne, Principal Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs, presented the case in support of 
the EUs security and defense policy.  He argued that an effective EU with an effective 
CFSP would be a power with shared values and strong Atlantic ties with which we could 
work to solve a number of the global problems and regional problems in other parts of the 
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world.120  A similar assessment was made by The Economist:   Combining the conflict-
prevention tools of the EU and the war-fighting and crisis-management experience of 
NATO should make it easier to deal with problems within Europe and beyond.  The 
caveat to that assessment was, But the deal is not sewn up yet.121   
 The hard issues  the heavy stones which have yet to be laid  include working 
out the planning processes and command and control arrangements, determining how 
access to NATO capabilities and assets will be achieved, and deciding how to include 
non-EU states in the planning and operational process.   While the French may insist on 
separate planning structures and separate bodies to ensure the EU has full autonomy in 
crisis management, the reality is that until the EU can come up with its own set of assets 
and capabilities, full autonomy will never be reached.  The price of using NATO assets is 
the requirement to work with NATO.  There really is no other choice.   
 Dr. Frank Kramer, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International 
Security Affairs, spoke at a roundtable on Department of Defense views concerning 
NATO and European Union defense planning.  The tone of his remarks was one of 
optimism and support for ESDP; however, he too stressed the need for transparency 
between NATO and the EU.  As he explained, Theres only one set of forces.  If there 
are potentially two different political directives, they have to have common priorities, 
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common planning so that there wont be inconsistent directives for the single set of 
forces.122  He discussed the planning issue at length to show how it would work in a 
NATO-EU relationship.  Kramer pointed out that there are three levels of planning:  
strategic planning, force planning and operational planning; and transparency must occur 
at all three levels.  Due to the significant overlap between NATO and the EU, the 
combined membership involves only 23 countries.123   This is a manageable number for 
strategic and force planning.  Moreover, because of Partnership for Peace, all of the non-
NATO EU countries are already doing some force planning with NATO.  Kramers 
argument, then, was that to bring these countries together with NATO is not hard 
because its already being done for the most part.124   He also pointed out that France 
does not do such planning with NATO.  According to Kramer, the French are working 
out how theyre going to do this because they have issues for themselves with respect to 
the headline goal and their capabilities conference.125    
 In terms of operational planning, Kramer described the Berlin Plus arrangement, 
whereby the Europeans would have assured access to the NATO planning mechanism, 
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whether the United States chooses to participate in the non-Article 5 operation or not.  
Although Berlin Plus had been agreed to, some issues still needed to be worked out, 
especially for the involvement of NATO countries that are not EU members; but he 
reiterated that the process was moving forward.  Kramer emphasized the fact that there is 
only one set of forces, so the claims that a European army is being formed are 
completely inaccurate.  The EU Rapid Reaction Force is merely a different way of 
organizing some of the same forces; and in all likelihood, the European Union members, 
the non-EU European NATO Allies, and the United States will still find ways to work 
together effectively.  
On the issue of command and control, the proposal offered by NATO is to have 
NATOs Deputy Supreme Allied Commander (DSACEUR), currently British General Sir 
Rupert Smith, command the EU Rapid Reaction Force.126  The Chief of Staff would then 
be chosen by the EUs Council of Ministers, which has nominated the current Director, 
EU Military Staff, German General Rainer Schuwirth.  Here too, the French are 
reportedly obstructing the final decision pending agreement on the mechanisms for 
planning; and while they are fairly isolated in their position, they bear enough weight to 
hold up progress.127  While the other EU member states have emphasized that their 
priority is to avoid unnecessary duplication, the French do not seem to endorse this idea 
wholeheartedly.    
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Although unofficially many Europeans are pessimistic about CESDPs potential 
impact on relations with the United States and NATO, the official view from all EU 
governments is that CESDP will strengthen the trans-Atlantic relationship.   German 
Ambassador Jürgen Chrobog made this official position clear in a speech in October 
2000.  He emphasized that CESDP will make a significant contribution to trans-Atlantic 
burden-sharing by developing European military capabilities.  Additionally, he argued 
that CESDP will strengthen trans-Atlantic ties because the EU will be able to use its 
crisis management capability to complement and reinforce NATO,128 and will do so 
when the United States and/or NATO is otherwise occupied or chooses not to take action.  
He stressed that the EU is not trying to compete with NATO, or to create a European 
army.  His final words summarize the optimistic view well:   
EU and NATO have very different backgrounds, histories 
and structures.  They will not detract from each other, but 
grow closer in values, convictions, and actions.  For the 
European Union, and Germany in particular, the 
transatlantic partnership and the U.S. political and military 
presence in Europe remain the key to peace and security on 
the European continent.  And one thing is absolutely 
certain:  NATO remains responsible for the collective 
defense of Europe.  NATO will not lose any of its 
importance, and ESDP will strengthen the European 
Union and NATO.129   
The key will be to get the European security culture to stand behind Ambassador 
Chrobogs words.    
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D. U.S. VIEWS OF CESDP 
The U.S. position towards CESDP can be described as cautiously supportive.   As 
long as the EU works within the framework of NATO, the United States will back 
CESDP wholeheartedly. While the United States naturally wishes to retain its influence 
in European security matters, U.S. authorities are convinced that NATO remains the key 
to preserving stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic region and the only reliable 
framework for the construction of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe.130  
Clearly emphasizing the primacy of NATOs role in European collective defense and 
security matters, as the Europeans themselves have done, William Cohen described the 
U.S. view of the EUs new security role:  It is right and natural that an increasingly 
integrated Europe seeks to develop its own Security and Defense Policy with a military 
capability to back it up.  Let me be clear on Americas position:  we agree with this goal 
 with wholehearted conviction.131  Yet he couched U.S. support in the context of his 
vision for a strong NATO-EU relationship: 
a relationship wherein NATO and EU efforts to strengthen 
European security are coherent and mutually reinforcing; 
the autonomy and integrity of decision-making in both 
organizations are respected, each organization dealing with 
the other on an equal footing; both organizations place a 
high premium on transparency, close and frequent contacts 
on a wide range of levels, and efforts that are 
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complementary; and there is no discrimination against any 
of the member states of either organization.132 
As Secretary Cohen also pointed out, it is difficult to envision a situation 
in which the European Union states would want to act on their own when the 
United States was prepared to assist them.  However, if the EU chose to do so, the 
EU should have assured access to NATOs operational and defense planning 
capabilities in peacetime, during an emerging crisis, during an EU-led crisis 
response operation using NATO capabilities and common assets, and during an 
EU-led crisis response operation that does not use NATO capabilities and 
common assets.133  In fact, he proposed a European Security and Defense 
Planning System (ESDPS), which would combine NATO and EU efforts into 
one collaborative approach to dealing with European security challenges.  
The United States clearly understands how important it is for the European NATO 
Allies and the EU to work together to improve their military capability.  By tying the 
EUs CESDP efforts to NATOs ESDI efforts, the United States is, in essence, attempting 
to uphold NATOs continued centrality in European security affairs.  A truly autonomous 
European Union capability  one that could accomplish the most demanding Petersberg 
tasks on its own, without U.S. support or perhaps even in the face of U.S. objections  
would mean less U.S. influence in Europe.  In certain extreme cases, the United States 
might find itself with no influence over the EUs actions in international security affairs.  
This is difficult to imagine, especially in light of William Cohens comment that the 
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United States intends to remain fully engaged in European security issues, both 
politically and militarily.134   However, the United States can do this most effectively 
through NATO. 
Peter Rodman, Director of National Security Programs at the Nixon 
Center in Washington, has discussed CFSP with caution.  One of his main points 
cannot be ignored from the standpoint of American foreign policy: For better or 
worse, implicitly or explicitly, Europes relationship to the United States is at the 
heart of what is being changed.135   
One of the reasons why the United States is concerned about CESDP is 
that it fears losing power and influence in European security affairs.  The 
possibility that a truly autonomous EU might take military action without seeking 
consensus in the Alliance is particularly troublesome for some U.S. observers.  
Jeffrey Gedmins testimony at a March 1999 Senate hearing reflects some of the 
skepticism held by U.S. observers.  Gedmin offered three reasons for his position.  
First, he alluded to an emerging political climate in the European Union itself, 
which I believe has tendencies, not dominant today  which, at their best, are 
anti-hegemonic and, at their worst, outright anti-American.136  Although the 
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French are regularly accused of harboring such sentiments, he pointed out that 
there is evidence that it is not only the French but other West Europeans and the 
Germans, too, who refer now to America as the rogue superpower.137 Second, he 
warned against underestimating the structural and historical obstacles to the 
West Europeans doing what we want them to do, and he cautioned that in times 
of crisis, the European formula institutionally may be a formula for common 
foreign and security policy, but the common part may often be for paralysis, 
inaction, and lowest common denominator politics.138 In effect, he has serious 
doubts that the EU could achieve a viable CFSP.  Third, Gedmin argued that, as a 
result of the end of the Cold War, the West Europeans feel less dependent on the 
United States; and with the generational change that is taking place, the 
Europeans are busy developing European institutions with minimal American 
participation and consultation.139   
Gedmins remarks were not meant as any argument for U.S. 
disengagement; on the contrary, he fully supports maintaining the Allied 
relationships in Europe.  However, he pointed out  - quite realistically  that while 
the United States wants to share its burdens, it also wants to remain a superpower, 
which has costs but also benefits. In Gedmins view, it makes sense to support 
the choices our European colleagues make.  They are sovereign, democratic 
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Nation-States.  But  for this process we have hopes and apprehensions.140 
Gedmins recommendation was to articulate these apprehensions and deal with 
them appropriately to mitigate their effects and ensure that they do not lead to 
undermining the Atlantic Alliance.   
However, the reality of the Europeans military weakness, which will not 
be alleviated substantially any time soon, should allay the fears expressed by 
some Americans.  Europe will continue to rely on the United States whether it 
wants to or not.  As Jay Garner states:  
There will be continued European reliance upon Americas 
unique strategic reach and access.  One example is space, 
though Europeans are likely to enter this domain somewhat 
more ambitiously in the next century.  Another example is 
troop and material lift, which remains a sine qua non for 
out-of-area sector operations.141 
It appears that, while many Europeans are content to rely on the United States, they do 
not want to admit it. 
François Heisbourg argues justifiably that a European Union with a 
stronger ability to act on its own would benefit NATO  and therefore the United 
States  for several reasons.  First, it would increase the flexibility of NATO, 
politically and militarily, by making a larger range of crisis management 
options available.  Second, it would increase the credibility of deterrence.  
Third, it would provide more forces to deal with the growing number of crises.  
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Significantly for the United States, this would reduce the risk of competition for 
access to U.S. military assets by the Europeans when the United States is facing a 
major crisis elsewhere.142  NATOs intervention in the Kosovo conflict certainly 
stretched the U.S. military capabilities  and it was not even a full-scale war.  
John Hulsman points out that  
Meeting Americas global commitments with the limited 
resources available in a peacetime economy will be one of 
the most challenging aspects of post Cold-War U.S. foreign 
and strategic policy.  The danger of overstretching the 
military is a real one for America, which must make the 
transition from a position of dominance in its alliances to 
one of leadership.143 
The fourth benefit of a strong autonomous EU capability that Heisbourg 
discusses is a greater redundancy of relatively scarce capabilities, thus increasing 
sustainability and diminishing the likelihood of unpleasant surprises.   
Additionally, it would allow for a more balanced burden-sharing among the 
Allies, which really means more balanced burden-sharing with the United 
States.144  CESDP could (and should) help NATO if it actually improves the 
defense capabilities of the member states.  From a United States perspective, this 
last point holds a substantial amount of weight because of all the criticism 
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Washington has directed toward the European Allies about America carrying too 
much of the load in terms of military capabilities. 
The United States perhaps views the situation as a zero sum game between burden 
sharing and power sharing.  The greater the burden carried, the more power and influence 
a state has in North Atlantic Council deliberations; but relinquishing a certain amount of 
that burden also means giving up a certain amount of power.  John Hulsman describes the 
inextricable link between burden sharing and power sharing.   
This means that the European pillar must increase its 
financial and military contributions to the alliance while 
claiming a greater amount of power within NATO.  
Likewise, while the United States would benefit from being 
able to decrease its transatlantic defense burden, it must 
consent to giving the Europeans a greater role in 
determining how the alliance is run.145   
Hulsmans comments refer to increasing the European NATO members role in Alliance 
affairs.  As CESDP develops, however, the United States will also have to include the 
non-NATO EU member states in the pool of Europeans that it cooperates with in 
European security activities.146  This is true, of course, as long as the EU member states 
contribute toward strengthening the European pillar. 
It is not a zero sum game, though.  It has already been shown that the United 
States will not lose all  or even most  of its influence in NATO, at least for the near 
term.  Therefore, the benefits for the United States in sharing the burden with the 
European Union will far outweigh the small amount of power that the United States may 
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have to relinquish.  Besides, the United States has been pushing for the European Allies 
to carry more of the weight of handling crises in their vicinity.  Not only is it imperative 
for the Europeans action to match their rhetoric; it is also necessary for the United 
States to remain engaged and to back its own words with concrete support for the 
Europeans in this latest initiative.    
Frank Kramer answered a question concerning whether ESDP would break the 
trans-Atlantic link by pointing out that first, the United States has vital interests in 
Europe, and second, Europe has vital interests in keeping the United States engaged in 
Europe.  On the basis of this common interest, common goals can be generated and the 
two organizations (NATO and the EU) can work together to achieve those goals.  He 
provided the following progress report on what has been accomplished towards this end 
so far: We arent finished.  There is work to be done  I dont want to tell you 
everything is done until it is done, but I do want to tell you that the process is reasonably 
sensible and making progress.147  While the work will not be accomplished overnight, it 
is important to continue to move forward and show evidence of the progress being made; 
and it is important for the United States to continue moving forward with NATO and the 
EU. 
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V. CONCLUSION:  FOUR POSSIBLE OUTCOMES 
A. PROSPECTS FOR CESDP AND FOR NATO 
A great deal of excitement has been generated since the European Union 
announced its new security ambitions in 1999.  The momentum for the initiative is 
promising, but some observers have expressed a sense of foreboding about what it may 
mean for NATO.  For those who favor European integration, CESDP is a tremendous 
step forward.  For those who desire a more balanced burden-sharing relationship with the 
United States, it holds the potential to make improved European military capabilities a 
reality.  For those who revere NATO and Europes ties with the United States, however, 
it has evoked mixed reactions.  It could either strengthen NATO or undermine it.    At 
this early stage, it is difficult to forecast the outcome, because much depends on decisions 
that have yet to be made.  
How the NATO-EU relationship develops over the next few years will be a 
critical factor in determining CESDPs overall impact on NATO and transatlantic ties.  
The success of the EUs emerging security role depends on positive interaction with 
NATO, for many challenges lie ahead for Europe.  In October 2000 William Cohen, then 
U.S. Secretary of Defense, listed them for NATOs defense ministers, though they apply 
equally to the EU: building security and preventing conflict within our Euro-Atlantic 
community and beyond; [responding] effectively to crises that we cannot prevent; and 
[rebuilding] war-torn societies after the shooting stops so that the cycle of violence will 
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not repeat itself. 148  Meeting these challenges will be difficult enough for NATO, let 
alone for an organization that has no real military experience.   
The EUs history of dealing effectively with crisis management has been 
unsuccessful thus far, primarily because it has lacked forces to give its efforts political 
credibility.   The Common Foreign and Security Policy set forth in the Maastricht Treaty 
consisted essentially of declarations until the EU member states as a group, led by Britain 
and France, finally admitted that military capabilities would be required to give the CFSP 
the backbone it needed.   Certainly, the organizational structures put in place to support 
such a capability are extremely important, and the EU has made substantive progress 
towards this end.  The more important and more demanding challenges are creating the 
military force to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks and making the appropriate 
arrangements for close interaction with NATO.      
Even though the EU aims to be able to carry out the full range of Petersberg tasks, 
it does not now have  nor will it soon have - the capability to do so.   It is conceivable 
that the force envisioned in the Headline Goal will be able to carry out humanitarian and 
peacekeeping missions, although even these missions will probably require NATO 
assistance, depending on their complexity.  It is not realistic to assume that the EU will be 
able to carry out the most demanding crisis management activities, such as peace 
enforcement, any time soon  and certainly not by 2003.  Achieving this goal will require 
obtaining all the capabilities identified as shortfalls in the capabilities gap assessments, 
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and this is no simple task.  Garnering the requisite number of military personnel is not as 
much of a problem, as the results of the Capabilities Commitment Conference show.  
However, supplying the necessary equipment and support (intelligence, logistics, 
communications architecture, training, etc.) for these forces represents a genuine 
challenge, given the budgetary priorities of EU governments.   
The EUs march towards the military capability it desires, whether truly 
autonomous or not, must begin with increased defense spending.  The United States 
supports the concept of CESDP because it should, in theory, strengthen the European 
pillar in NATO and thus promote a more balanced burden-sharing relationship with the 
United States.  However, at this point, even though the EU has taken significant steps in 
establishing its Rapid Reaction Force, in reality the force does not reflect any real 
increase in capability on the part of the European participants.  It is merely a re-
organization of the same forces.   
Only by significantly increasing defense spending, which is not evidently in the 
future plans of most EU member states, will the EU ever be able to achieve its Headline 
Goal and other capability goals.  This will not only take time; more importantly, it will 
require political will and sustained commitment by the various member countries to 
provide the money and resources.   As the embarrassment of the Europeans weakness in 
the Kosovo intervention fades with time (and if relative peace and stability prevail on the 
continent), it will be increasingly difficult for European Union governments to feel 
justified in making the necessary increases in defense spending to address the shortfalls.   
In just two years, the EU has indeed made significant progress toward realizing its 
88 
Common Foreign and Security Policy; the key will be to keep the momentum going to 
make CESDP a reality, even if progress is made one small step at a time.   
When Geoff Hoon, the Secretary of State for Defence in the United Kingdom, 
made a statement to the House of Commons on 22 November 2000, following the end of 
the Capabilities Commitment Conference, he described CESDP as 
a planning process to ensure a more effective defence effort 
by European forces, and a mechanism to improve European 
contributions to NATO and to ensure that European nations 
can in future play a more effective part in Allliance 
operations.149   
EU officials have made it clear that the EUs efforts are going to be coordinated with 
NATO, and that one of the aims of CESDP is to strengthen the trans-Atlantic link; but the 
details of the relationship, which have yet to be completely worked out, face some serious 
challenges that will not be overcome easily.  Stagnant defense budgets aside, internal 
divisions among the EU member states pose potential problems.  Specifically, Frances 
pursuit of full autonomy and independence from the United States could lead to a 
wasteful duplication of structures and operational efforts.  Some EU observers have 
expressed concern that French reservations about cooperation with NATO could lead to 
an undermining of the transatlantic relationship.  It is also true, though, that the EU as a 
whole needs to remain flexible in its efforts to work with non-EU member states that 
wish to contribute to the EUs Rapid Reaction Force.  This means allowing those 
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contributing states to have an acceptable amount of involvement in the decision-making 
processes involving their forces.   
B. FOUR POSSIBLE SCENARIOS 
As far as the prospects for CESDP and its impact on NATO are concerned, the 
EUs current security and defense ambitions could lead to four possible outcomes. Each 
of these outcomes has implications for the future of European security, NATO, and 
Europes relationship with the United States. 
1. Continuing deficiency in European Union military capabilities, in 
conjunction with uncoordinated decision-making structures with 
NATO.   
This scenario holds the greatest threat to NATO and the transatlantic relationship.  
CESDP would fail and European security would be at stake.  While it would not 
necessarily lead to an undermining of the Alliance, relations would be at the least 
severely strained  among the NATO members and the non-NATO EU members, and 
especially between the United States and Europe.  The United States has made it clear 
that its support for CESDP is contingent upon close EU interaction with NATO.  The 
lack of such interaction coupled with U.S. frustration with the Europeans inability to 
shoulder more of the burden of crisis management, especially in Europe itself, would   
probably mean withdrawal of U.S. support for the initiative.  The worst possible outcome 
would result if the EU failed to achieve the military capability it desires, but undermined 
the NATO Alliance in the process of trying.  In that case, there would be no reliable 
means of crisis management in Europe, and the Europeans would not be able to rely on 
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the United States to come to their assistance.  The breakdown of NATO could have far-
reaching consequences for political order in Europe.150   
2. Continuing deficiency in military capabilities, but in conjunction with 
coordinated decision-making structures with NATO.   
This scenario, which is one of the more likely outcomes, would lead to a situation 
little different from the one that exists today.  The European pillar of the Alliance would 
remain relatively weak and the United States would continue to urge that the European 
NATO members share more of the burden in crisis management.  The EU would not have 
achieved its goals for an autonomous capability and would continue to rely on U.S. 
capabilities and assets.  However, the United States would retain the influence it currently 
has in European security affairs.  With coordinated decision-making structures in place, 
the relationship between the EU and NATO would be fairly solid, so the Alliance would 
probably not be threatened.  The United States would also continue to support CESDP.  
Because of the established relations between the two organizations and the goodwill of 
the United States, there would be a greater chance that the Europeans (whether European 
NATO members and/or EU members) would eventually be able to improve their military 
capabilities and the EU would achieve its goal. 
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3. Improvement in military capabilities, in conjunction with decision-
making structures uncoordinated with NATO.   
This scenario could undermine NATO and the transatlantic ties; and from the U.S. 
perspective, it could be almost as threatening as the first scenario described.  The tension 
caused by the EU trying to conduct its own operations without proper consultation with 
NATO would lead to frustration among European countries (within and outside the EU) 
and the United States.  There would undoubtedly be wasteful duplication of structures 
and assets, which the Europeans can ill afford.  As the NATO Alliance weakened, the 
United States would lose its influence in European security matters.  On the one hand, 
because certain assets would still most likely be commonly funded and maintained 
NATO assets, the EU could find its hands tied in trying to conduct crisis management 
operations.  On the other hand, the European Union member states could hypothetically 
decide that NATO was no longer necessary at all.  This would lead to the EU having full 
autonomy to conduct crisis management operations, regardless of the views of the United 
States and other non-EU NATO countries.  The chance that Britain and some of the other 
EU members that cherish the relationship with the United States would let this happen, 
and the chance that the European Union would achieve such a military capability as to be 
fully independent of the United States, even in collective defense contingencies, appears 
to be small in the foreseeable future; but the possibility must be considered for the long-
term. 
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4. Improvement in military capabilities, in conjunction with coordinated 
NATO-EU decision-making structures.   
This is the goal and the most desirable outcome for the United States, NATO, and 
the EU.  CESDP would be successful and the European Union would be able to handle 
more security challenges on its own, without necessarily calling on the United States.  
Ultimately, the more balanced burden-sharing relationship would lead to a strengthened 
Alliance, but the United States would also retain influence in Europe through NATO.  
Unfortunately, this goal is not realistic at this time. 
C. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
There are strong incentives for the EU to develop a greater capacity to deal with 
security challenges other than collective defense.  Developing an effective capability for 
crisis management would strengthen its political authority in the international arena and 
provide it with more options when crises arise.  It would be ideal, and most efficient, if 
the EU and NATO fused their efforts into one coordinated approach to crisis 
management.  Instead of two distinct organizations working separately, but relying on the 
same assets and trying to pursue their activities in an uncoordinated way, there would be 
one streamlined organization dealing with European security.  William Cohens proposal 
in October 2000 of a consolidated EU-NATO collaborative planning system, the 
European Security and Defense Planning System (ESDPS), is one that should be pursued 
and developed. 
The extent to which NATO and the EU coordinate their crisis management efforts 
as well as the strength and resilience of the trans-Atlantic ties will be determining factors 
93 
in the success of CESDP.  The United States supports an independent European Union 
capability as a way of strengthening the transatlantic relationship, but considers it 
imperative that the EUs new security role be developed within the framework of NATO, 
lest the future of the Alliance be threatened.  If NATO crumbled, the security of Europe 
would be at stake and the transatlantic ties would have to be placed on new institutional 
foundations.  As the new Secretary of Defense for the Bush Administration, Donald 
Rumsfeld, said in February 2001,  
Weaken NATO and we weaken Europe, which weakens all 
of us.  We and the other nations of the alliance are bound 
together in pursuit and preservation of something great and 
good, indeed, something without parallel in history.  Our 
greatest asset still lies in our values  freedom, democracy, 
respect for human rights and the rule of law.  And in the 
face of shared risks, we still must share the 
responsibility.151 
It will be incumbent upon the EU and NATO both to ensure that the structures being put 
in place now will be effective and durable.  
Despite the desire to obviate the need for U.S. participation in dealing with 
security challenges in Europe as much as possible, the EU states and the non-EU 
European members of NATO will continue to rely on U.S. military capabilities for the 
foreseeable future, at least in large-scale contingencies.  The degree of that reliance will 
depend on whether the European Union countries can make their military capabilities 
strong enough to match their rhetoric.     
                                                 
151 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Munich Conference on European Security Policy, Defense Link, 3 
February 2001, remarks as delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld in Munich, Germany on 
3 February 2001.  Available Online: http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/s20010203-secdef.html. 
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As Secretary Rumsfelds remarks indicate, the United States remains committed 
to ensuring the security of Europe.  Because of the common ideals shared with Europe  
those of preserving peace and security, and promoting peace and democracy  Rumsfeld 
said, Our consultations and cooperation are at the center of this new world.152  NATO 
remains the key institution for sustaining the U.S. commitment in Europe, however.  The 
United States must remain actively engaged with the European Union as the framework 
for CESDP develops.  This is absolutely necessary if America wants to safeguard its 
interests in Europe and, indeed, the larger interests of the Alliance as a whole, including 
peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region.  In the end, both sides of the Atlantic will 
benefit.  As the United States works with its European Allies and the EU to improve their 
military capabilities, the resulting strengthened European pillar will serve to enhance the 
transatlantic relationship.   
The reality is that the EU will pursue CESDP.  The United States has accepted 
that and supports this effort if it is done correctly  in a way that allows for transparency 
with NATO and leads to tangible improvements in European military capabilities.  
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that it will be pursued properly.  Blunders could lead 
to the undermining of the most successful political-military alliance the modern world 
has known.  Evidently, this is a risk that the EU and NATO are willing to take, with the 
hope that the common values and interests that span the Atlantic are strong enough to 
overcome the most difficult obstacles. 
 
                                                 
152 Ibid. 
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